



**INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS**

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**PARISH CLERGY ON INTEGRATION  
WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION**

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## Introduction

Integration of Poland and other Central and Eastern European countries with the European Union is a historic event that ends the division of Europe pursuant to the Yalta Agreement. It will have short- and long-term political, social and economic consequences for Poland and its citizens.

The Church has always participated in historic events taking place in Poland and played a significant role in democratic transformations, while in the process transforming itself as well. The episcopate has always made its position known at moments important to the country, whereas parish clergy, jointly with other members of local elites, has been behind influencing the opinions of many people. This is why it is so important to find out what clergy thinks about integration with the European Union and its anticipated consequences for Poland, the Church and the society.

On the eve of the accession referendum, the attitude of parish priests and vicars with respect to the referendum campaign and to the participation of Church representatives therein constitutes key information. Equally important is to become acquainted with the clergy's views on changes that are and will continue to take place inside the Polish Church and opinions on challenges awaiting it. It is also interesting to learn the manner in which the clergy perceives religious and moral attitudes of the Polish society as well as new forms of religiosity.

The Institute of Public Affairs survey "Parish clergy on European integration" constitutes follow up of a survey conducted by the Institute among the clergy in 1998. That project resulted in several publications and a series of seminars and conferences. A discussion of the survey was published in 1999 in a book issued by the Institute of Public Affairs entitled *Polish Eurodebate*. Both the report and the book met with a great deal of interest in Poland and abroad because they shattered the stereotypes that some groups had about the Church in Poland and attitudes of its representatives toward European integration. Some issues that were the subject of our interest in 1998 were repeated in the latest survey, thus making it possible to follow changes taking place in this important social group. Some questions asked in the present survey deal with new issues.

Comparisons made in the report are many-sided, which provides for drawing in-depth conclusions. On one hand, the outcome of the latest survey is compared with the results of the survey conducted in 1998 on a sample of clerics selected in the same manner (although made up of different individuals)<sup>1</sup>. On the other hand, the views expressed by the clergy in 2002 have been compared with those held by a group similar in terms of education ("university graduates") and by the overall population. This makes it not only possible to capture changes that have occurred in the attitude of the clergy over time but also to better characterize their views against the background of similarities and differences in the attitude of other social groups.

The survey of the Institute of Public Affairs was conducted in the field by Ośrodek Badań Opinii Publicznej (*Public Opinion Survey Centre*) – OBOP - between October 11<sup>th</sup> and November 5<sup>th</sup> of 2002 year. Pollsters visited several hundred randomly selected parishes and conducted 600 interviews – 300 with parish priests and 300 with vicars.

The authors wish to thank Dr. Mirosława Grabowska, Rev. Prof. Helmut Juros, Rev. Dr. Piotr Mazurkiewicz, Prof. Antoni Sułek and Dr. hab. Paweł Sztabiński for their valuable comments on the questionnaire and the report.

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<sup>1</sup> A description of the conduct of the survey is provided in the final chapter of this report.

## **Main survey conclusions**

### **Poland's parish clergy – a profile**

- Over half (55%) of Poland's priests come from small villages (i.e. went to primary schools in small villages) and another 20% come from small towns of up to 20 thousand inhabitants. All the priests have higher education degrees, and a third went on to do a supplementary degree. Priests are well traveled. This year half of them went abroad while a mere 5% have never left Poland. Three quarters of the country's clergy know a foreign language.
- The priests evaluate their financial condition more highly than the average Pole.
- The priests are interested in politics (32% of those very interested) tellingly more so than the rest of the society (14%)
- Most of the priests declare moderately right wing (51%) or strongly right wing (29%) sympathies.
- The most popular daily newspaper among the clerics is "*Nasz Dziennik*" (read by a half of those questioned) and "*Niedziela*" is the most popular weekly magazine. "*Radio Maryja*" is the most popular radio station. Half the priests listen to it regularly (at least a few times per week). However, the number of listeners of this radio station among the priests has fallen in comparison with 1998. Over half the priests use the internet.

### **Priests and public life**

- Unemployment, crime, corruption and the incompetence of those in power are the biggest problems Poland faces, according to the priests. Terrorism, hunger and social injustice are the biggest problems in the world today.
- Almost half the priests think that Poland's interior situation is bad. However their expectations as to an improvement over the next five years are notably higher than those of the average Pole and also higher than those of people with higher education. This optimism is characteristic for most of the priests who support Poland's accession into the European Union.

- A solid majority of the clerics (59%) deem democracy to be the best of possible political systems. Over half the priests (52%) express satisfaction with the present state of Polish democracy. This distinguishes the priests from the rest of society (24% express contentment) and even from Poles with university degrees, amongst whom a significant majority say they are unhappy with Polish democracy.
- It is those priests who are in favour of Poland's accession to the European Union and those who express moderately right wing sympathies who are relatively most satisfied with the state of Polish democracy.
- Most of the parish priests share the opinion that the Catholic Church should not be directly involved in politics.

### **Support for EU accession**

- The priests view the integration with the EU as a strategic choice for Poland, more favoured than any other possible scenario: a neutral Poland, a closer relationship with the US, a rapprochement with Russia.
- The priests' interest in matters concerning accession to the EU is similar to the interest of the rest of society but lower than that of those who hold a university diploma.
- Almost all of the interviewed priests say they will vote in the accession referendum.
- A large majority of the priests (59%) are for Poland's integration with the EU, nevertheless their support is lower than that declared in similar research conducted by the Institute of Public Affairs (ISP) in 1998 (84%). At present it is comparable with the support of the rest of society but lower than that of people holding a university degree.
- Lower support was noted among the readers of "*Nasz Dziennik*" and the listeners of "*Radio Maryja*", although even in this group the majority is in favour of Poland's membership in the EU (53% of the regular listeners of this radio station).
- Integration tends to trigger more positive feelings (hope, interest and acceptance) and less negative feelings (concern, dislike, boredom or indifference).
- The priests are aware of the Polish Episcopate's and of Pope John-Paul II's position on integration. They believe that the Church was right to take a position on this matter but they are wary of undertaking any actions which could be interpreted by society at large as the Church taking an active part in politics.



- The priests say that the Church should call make clear its position on joining the EU and call on the faithful to take part in the referendum.

### **The information campaign preceding the referendum**

- According to most of the priests their parishioners are interested in European integration however only 26% of the priests believe that the parishioners back integration with the EU. Most of the priests are certain that their parishioners fear the consequences of integration.
- One out of four priests has taken part in a meeting, a seminar or a training in matters concerning the integration with the EU.
- Only one third of those questioned have undertaken or intend to undertake activities related to the referendum. However the great majority say they will not participate in any such activities.
- Activities conducted include the encouragement of existing parish associations and organisations to take up discussions concerning this matter; starting conversations with the faithful; propagation of the cults of the patron saints of Europe.
- Most of the priests refuse to consider the possibility of disseminating printed information concerning European integration on church premises.

### **The image of the European Union**

- The priests are more convinced than four years ago that the member states of the European Union are linked more by common interests than by common values. The opinion that the EU cares most for the interests of the countries which have the strongest economies is shared by a larger number of priests than before.
- Most of the priests believe that the EU creates the right conditions for the development of national cultures.
- The priests attach great importance to including a reference to Europe's Christian roots in the text of the European constitution. Most of the priests also support the placement of the following issues in the constitutional treaty: religious freedom, *Invocatio Dei* and the recognition of the Church as a legal entity.

## **The consequences of integration for Poland**

- The priests' support for integration is due to belief that this process will be favourable for Poland. The hopes linked with the accession to the EU mainly involve an improvement in international security, law and order or in civil liberties. A large part of the priests (62%) believe that integration will have a positive effect on Polish economy.
- Their fears mainly concern the influence of integration on the durability of the Polish family, on religion and on the customs and morals of the Poles. At the same time uneasiness has arisen concerning the changes in legislation- which might ensue after the accession- in matters which concern the Church such as abortion, euthanasia or homosexual marriages.
- Integration with the EU is not a threat for Poland's independence and national identity, according to two-thirds of the priests.
- Priests, as the rest of society, are more and more often of the opinion that relations, up to date, between Poland and the European Union are mainly profitable for the latter. Just like most other Poles the priests are afraid that Poland will become a second-category member of the EU.
- Most of the clerics believe that EU's financial aid will be of great importance or very great importance. At the same time almost half of the clergy believe that Poland will have to bear the financial burden of its integration. The benefits ensuing from integration won't be immediate and Poland will have to wait for them for a few years, according to the priests.

## **Polish priesthood in the face of change**

- European integration will not influence the position or the importance of the Catholic Church in Poland, according to the clergy.
- In comparison with 1998 less and less priests believe that during the last decade the authority of the Church and its opinion forming possibilities have become smaller. Lately the financial situation of the Church and of the clergy has worsened according to the priests.

- Even though some priests notice a certain diminution of religiousness in Polish society, at the same time in their parishes religious life is very rich and diverse. Three quarters of the parishes take part in charitable activities.
- The priests are aware (and believe this to be something perfectly normal) that inside the Church there exist significant differences of views on key matters. At the same time 60% believe that the Church should strive to attain the greatest possible homogeneity of views held by the clergy.
- In comparison with 1998 there are less priests who believe that the views of *Radio Maryja* are representative for the whole of the clergy. Only one third of the priests believe that the political views voiced by *Radio Maryja* reflect accurately the views of the Polish clergy. At the same time the priests are divided and hold different opinions as to whether Radio Maryja should or should not broadcast political content.
- According to the clerics the Catholic Church in Poland has more to offer to the churches in the countries of the European Union than vice-versa.




## Characteristics of the parish clergy

Most surveyed clerics have been raised in villages and small towns (up to 20,000 residents); only one respondent in nine grew up in a large urban centre (over 100,000 residents).

**Fig. 1.** Respondent background

(in %)



Source: Institute of Public Affairs

With such large representation of individuals who have grown up in the countryside or in small towns, the high ratio of university graduates represented in the group is quite surprising. Even if we assume that studies at a seminary are a compulsory and natural element of a cleric's education, the proportion of clerics who have graduated from an additional study program (32%) still by far exceeds the education level of the overall Polish population.

**Table 1.** Knowledge of foreign languages

(in %)

		Clerics 2002*	Overall population 2001**	University graduates 2001**
<b>Total</b>	<b>knows</b>	<b>74</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>82</b>
	<b>does not know</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>18</b>
German		47	14	-
English		33	16	-
Russian		26	23	-
French		14	2	-

Source: \* Institute of Public Affairs

\*\* Centrum Badań Opinii Społecznych (CBOS), October 2001.

Frequent travel is undoubtedly one of the reasons prompting clerics to learn foreign languages (only 5% of respondents have never been abroad whereas more than one half have travelled out of Poland as recently as this year). Close to three quarters of respondents can communicate in a foreign language, most often in German or English. Surveyed clerics viewed their personal financial situation in a much better light than the overall population. There was even a certain improvement over its perception against four years ago - a rare phenomenon in today's Poland.

**Table 2.**

(w %)

Assessment of personal financial situation	Clerics in each survey *		Overall population **	University graduates **
	1998	2002	2002	2002
Good	68	73	23	41
Neither good nor bad	27	25	47	45
Bad	5	2	30	14

Source: \* Institute of Public Affairs

\*\* CBOS, November 2002

A separate issue that may help describe the Polish clergy is its interest in the public and political discourse. Good education, frequent foreign travel, knowledge of languages that facilitates acquaintance with visited countries and a relatively stable financial status should result in a rather keen interest in Polish and world affairs. A comparison between surveys of political interest in the overall population and among the clergy shows clearly that the interest in politics is much higher in the latter group.

**Table 3.** Interest in current political affairs

(in %)

Interest in politics	Clerics in each survey *		Overall population **	University graduates **
	1998	2002	2002	2002
High	35	32	14	36
Average	57	58	49	53
Low / None	8	10	37	11

Source: \* Institute of Public Affairs

\*\* CBOS, March 2002.

The clergy has firmly aligned its sympathies with the right wing of the political spectrum. This phenomenon stands out in particular when confronted with the data for the overall population, where left-wing and centrist views dominate. However, it should be noted that the percentage of clerics declaring centrist or left-wing view has grown somewhat in comparison to 1998.

**Table 4.** Political views

Political views	Clerics in each survey *		(w %)
	1998	2002	Overall population **
Left-wing/centrist	8	12	52
Right-wing	56	51	20***
Definitely right-wing	30	29	

Source: \* Institute of Public Affairs

\*\* CBOS, March 2002

\*\*\* There was no "Definitely right-wing" option provided for that group.  
There was no "Undecided" option.

Compared to the results of 1998, preferences concerning the press read by clerics have also changed a great deal. Data acquired four years ago did not take into account reading *Nasz Dziennik* daily newspaper, which one half of respondents to the latest survey has indicated as favourite. Four years ago, *Życie* was the most popular newspaper among the clergy, but now it is read by only 8%. Figures for other newspapers have stayed pretty much the same. On the other hand, the percentage of clerics that did not read any newspaper at all has grown to 20% of respondents.

**Table 5.** Daily newspapers favoured by clerics

What national daily newspapers do you read?	1998	2002
Rzeczpospolita	17	20
Gazeta Wyborcza	30	28
Nasz Dziennik	no data <sup>2</sup>	50
Trybuna	1	1
Super Express	8	8
Życie	48	8
None, I do not read newspapers	12	20

Source: Institute of Public Affairs

Several answers could be given to each question, hence the total exceeding 100%.

<sup>2</sup> *Nasz Dziennik* did not yet exist when the 1998 survey was done.

It should be noted that, in the general opinion, *Nasz Dziennik* was promoting radical views, particularly with respect to European integration. Consequently, since so many clerics read it, those views should be reflected in what they had to say in the survey. We will return to this issue later in the report.


Most popular periodicals among clerics were *Niedziela* (52%), *Gość Niedzielny* (33%), *Wprost* (17%), *Newsweek* (16%), *Tygodnik Powszechny* (14%) and *Polityka* (13%). Compared to the previous survey, there was a noticeable growth in the readership of socio-political magazines such as *Polityka* and *Wprost*<sup>3</sup>. In 1998, both periodicals earned jointly only 11% of responses against close to three times more this year (approximately 30%). Out of the entire group of surveyed clerics only 3% did not read periodicals at all.

The fact that more than 55% of clerics used the Internet testifies to their more-than-average interest in the surrounding world and openness to new technologies. This result is much different from that for the overall population (17% according to CBOS).

The survey has shown that clerics most often listened to *Radio Maryja*. However, the number of staunch listeners ("every day or almost") has fallen quite a bit (by close to 10%) since four years ago.

**Fig. 2.** Listening to *Radio Maryja* in 1998 and 2002.

(in %)




Source: Institute of Public Affairs

<sup>3</sup> *Newsweek* was not being published in Poland at the time of the 1998 survey.



**Fig. 3.** Listening to various radio stations

(in %)



Source: Institute of Public Affairs

\* No data for 1998.

Compared to the previous count, the popularity of commercial radio channels has risen: *Radio Zet* and *Radio RMF* have noted among clerics an almost 10% popularity rise. The number of listeners to Public Radio channels has not changed much. The number of clerics listening to local or diocese Catholic radio channels has fallen noticeably, and so has the number of fans of regional Public Radio channels. This has been caused probably by the appearance of two new broadcasters – *Vatican Radio* and *Radio Plus* – which currently enjoy high popularity among the clergy.

To sum it up, clerics constituted a group that was well educated, satisfied with their financial status, fond of traveling, with a more-than-average interest in politics and rather homogenous in political attitudes (their decisive majority identified with the right, which does not mean that there was a unity of views *sensu stricto*).

## Clerics and public life

Clerics participating in the survey were asked to point at problems which in their opinion were most important to the world and to Poland. Among the issues troubling the world, clerics were particularly worried about terrorism (that response was selected much more often than others) and hunger. Younger clerics were much less worried about terrorism than older ones. Only 43% of clerics younger than 35 selected terrorism as the biggest world problem compared to as many as 66% of clerics over 50. In turn, the youngest clerics more frequently pointed at the destruction of the natural environment, poverty, social injustice, breakdown of the family and diminishing spirituality among the population.


Interestingly, listening to *Radio Maryja* turned out to have little influence on the selection of problems that illustrated the deterioration of traditional Christian values (breakdown of the family, diminished spirituality, departure from God).

Among problems most important to Poland, clerics pointed first and foremost at the crime rate, then corruption, government incompetence and poverty. Among the youngest clerics, corruption and government incompetence came second (39%), whereas the oldest clerics had no hesitation pointing first at the crime rate (46%). Clerics who declared sharing the views of the political right expressed their concern about the growing crime rate (42%), whereas those leaning toward the left and centre pointed at poverty as the most serious world problem (38%). Issues directly associated with clerical activities were also found important – departure from God (16%), breakdown of the family (30%). As in the case of the analysis of most troubling world problems, listening to *Radio Maryja* was not an important factor influencing the diversification of responses.

The nature of problems indicated by clerics as most important for Poland combined with their assessment of the situation in the country gave an illustration of that group's attitude to the current condition of the Polish state. The opinion of the clergy was not unequivocally negative - what is more, a much larger proportion in the group accepted the direction in which the domestic situation was heading than the overall population. However, clerics were more pessimistic than surveyed university graduates.

**Fig. 4.** Most troubling problems in the world and in Poland

(in %)



Source: Institute of Public Affairs

Several responses could be given to each question, hence the total exceeding 100%.

**Table 1.** Assessment of the situation in Poland

(in %)

Is the overall situation in Poland improving or deteriorating?	Clerics 2002*	Overall population 2002**	University graduates 2002**
Improving	36	26	40
Deteriorating	48	59	42

Source: \* Institute of Public Affairs

\*\* CBOS, November 2002

There was no "Undecided" option.

A negative attitude to integration with the European Union was most often linked to a negative assessment of the situation in Poland. The proportion was reversed among respondents who favoured unification with the EU: more than one half of that group (52%) believed that Poland was heading toward a bright future.

**Table 2.** Assessment of the domestic situation and support for integration with the EU.

(in %)

Attitude toward integration with the EU	Is the domestic situation heading in a good or bad direction?		
	Good	Bad	Undecided
Supporters	52	34	14
Opponents	11	81	8
Undecided	20	55	25

Source: Institute of Public Affairs

Clerics living in west and south-west Poland had a much more positive view of the domestic situation than the overall group of respondents. Most sceptical were clerics in parishes located in the north, centre and mid-west of the country.

While one half of the surveyed clergy assessed the current situation in Poland as definitely bad, respondents forecasted major improvements in the next five years. The reasons for this optimism may lie in the hopes associated with Poland joining the European Union and paced in a different government. There was a strong link between support for Poland's integration with the EU and a positive outlook at Poland's future.

**Table 3.** Anticipated development of the situation in Poland

(in %)

Will the situation in Poland improve, deteriorate or stay the same in the next five years?	Clerics 2002*	Overall population 2002**	University graduates 2002**
Improve	36	15	18
Stay the same	34	50	56
Deteriorate	20	25	20

Source: \* Institute of Public Affairs

\*\* CBOS, November 2002


The "Undecided" option was not provided.

The overall population and university graduates were asked the following question: "Do you believe that the situation in Poland will improve, deteriorate or stay the same in the coming year?".

In addition to a specific analysis of the domestic situation, clerics were also asked to assess democracy in general as a system of governance, without taking into consideration the Polish political context. The survey showed that the majority of clerics recognized and approved of the principal democratic values, although there existed a sceptical group that looked at democracy as governance by political party cliques and a system that caused disarray.

**Fig. 2.** Most frequent connotations of the term "democracy"

(in %)



Source: Institute of Public Affairs

More than one half of surveyed clerics (59%) admitted to democracy being the best political system created to date, which in combination with the connotation of the term

"democracy" allows to deduce that the clergy was pro-European and in most cases did not see any alternative to the democratic system. However, it is worth noting that almost one quarter of the surveyed group pointed at a non-democratic government as an alternative acceptable in certain situations. This group was particularly well represented among opponents to Poland joining the European Union. The proportion of clerics who agreed with that statement was almost twice higher among opponents of integration than among its supporters.

**Table 4.** Attitude of the clergy to democratic and non-democratic governments

(in %)

Which of the following statements is closest to your views?	
Democracy is superior to all other forms of governance	59
Certain non-democratic types of governance may be more desirable than democratic	24
For people like myself there is no difference whether the government is democratic or not	12

Source: Institute of Public Affairs

The "Undecided" option was not provided.

While the clergy accepted democracy as a value system, it divided when it came to assessing how it was being applied in Poland. A small majority of surveyed clerics expressed satisfaction with the current Polish political system. However, it should be noted that, in comparison to the overall population, a much larger proportion of respondents to our survey was satisfied with "Polish democracy" – more than twice as many as university graduates.

**Table 5.** Assessment of Polish democracy

(in %)

Satisfaction with democracy as it exists in Poland	Clerics 2002*	Overall population 2002**	University graduates 2002**
Satisfied	52	24	25
Dissatisfied	43	65	69

Source: \* Institute of Public Affairs

\*\* CBOS, November 2002

The "Undecided" option was not provided.

Political views and attitude toward European integration were significant determinants of satisfaction with democracy in Poland. There was an important prevalence of positive assessments among proponents of Poland joining the EU and clerics placing themselves on the right of the political spectrum.

**Table 6.** Satisfaction with democracy vs. political views and attitude toward integration with the EU  
(in %)

Political views	Satisfaction with democracy in Poland	
	Satisfied	Dissatisfied
Left and centre	46	48
Right	57	40
Definitely right	49	46
Attitude toward integration with the EU	Satisfied	Dissatisfied
For integration	63	34
Against integration	35	65
Undecided	41	52


Source: Institute of Public Affairs

The "Hard to say" option was not provided.

The issue of State/Church relations seemed to divide clerics into two extreme groups. One was made up of opponents of any influence whatsoever of Church institutions on government policy and church-goers' political views. The other group believed that the Church must exert this type of influence. Clerics' opinions on whether the Church should be exerting influence on the government were divided almost exactly in half. More than one half of surveyed clerics disagreed with the statement that non-believers ought not to hold public office. Also more than one half rejected the idea of the Church having the right to influence electoral decisions of the believers. The statement that a government made up of people who believed in God would be better for Poland received the greatest amount of approval among the entire surveyed group.

**Fig 3.** Perception of State/ Church relations

(in%)



Source: Institute of Public Affairs

Two quite radical statements on religious believers holding public office and clerics' influence on the way church-goers vote were nevertheless accepted by approx. 30% of the surveyed group. A closer analysis of the responses provided by clerics who held definitely right-wing views and regularly listened to *Radio Maryja* revealed statistically significant dependencies that point at their higher inclination to accept this type of views.

As concerns influencing church-goers' voting decisions, as many as 41% of clerics serving urban parishes approved this type of behaviour, whereas the approval rate among rural clerics was significantly lower (33%), which may point to places where such practices are actually taking place. Also, clerics who listened to *Radio Maryja* and held definitely right-wing views accepted that type of political campaigning. The disapproval rate was the highest among clergy holding left-wing or centrist views and among proponents of Poland joining the EU.

The response to the question about religious believers holding public office demonstrated once again the significance of variables related to political views, *Radio Maryja* and support for integration of Poland with the EU. The connection between regional diversification and specific responses was also perceivable. Most supportive of the statement that public offices should be held by religious believers were clerics from central and northern Poland, whereas least supportive were clerics residing in the western and south-western part of the country.

Church influence on government policy was an issue that clearly divides the clergy. The variable that impacted that issue the most was interest in politics.

**Table 7.** Interest in politics and Church influence on government policy

(in %)

Interest in politics	Do you agree that the Church should not influence government policy?	
	Yes	No
<b>Total</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>45</b>
High	41	54
Medium	49	43
Low	57	29

Source: Institute of Public Affairs

The "Hard to say" option was not provided.



The results of the survey of clerics showed a group that was largely accepting of the direction adopted in the country's development, approving of the democratic system and rejecting the influence of the Church institution on the way the country was governed. However, there was also a less numerous group which had a less positive opinion of democracy, the Polish political system and domestic political situation, and who supported a stronger presence of the Church in political life.

## Support of the clergy for Poland's integration with the European Union

The societal interest in issues associated with Poland joining the European Union grows as the debate on that subject intensifies. The same growth of interest is perceivable among the parish clergy. While 76% of clerics surveyed in 1998 declared their interest in the subject, the current survey showed that 84% of clerics were very or somewhat interested in integration. However, it should be noted that only 19% declared being very interested, which was far below the high proportion of 38% of university graduates declaring that amount of interest. Also, in the past five years, the growth of interest in Poland's integration with the EU among the clergy has been slower than among university graduates. The current number of clerics *very* interested in EU issues approximated the level declared by the overall population.

**Table 1.** Interest in European Union affairs, institutions and policies

(in %)

To what extent are you interested in EU affairs, institutions and policies?	Clerics 1998*	<b>Clerics 2002*</b>	Overall population 2002**	University graduates 2002**
- Very interested	14	<b>19</b>	17	38
- Somewhat interested	62	<b>65</b>	50	47
- Not very interested	20	<b>13</b>	19	12
- Not interested at all	3	<b>3</b>	13	1
Hard to say	1	<b>0</b>	1	2

Source: \* Institute of Public Affairs

\*\* CBOS; see *Integracja Polski z Unią Europejską – zainteresowanie i poinformowanie*, Survey Report, November 2002

Interest in politics was the criterion for response differentiation. On the other hand, no such dependencies were detected with respect to features such as parish type, education, political views or listening to *Radio Maryja*.

An overwhelming majority of surveyed clerics intended to participate in the accession referendum. More than 75% of respondents stated that they would surely go to vote on the issue. When put against the significantly lower number of responses confirming an interest in integration, these answers indicated that clerics viewed voting on this issue as their civic duty rather than an expression of personal interest. Clerics interested in politics and those declaring definitely (rather than moderately) right-wing political views were more certain of voting in the referendum.

**Table 2.** Participation in the referendum on Poland joining the European Union

(in %)

Will you participate in the referendum?	Clerics 2002*	Overall population 2002**	University graduates 2002**
Definitely yes	76	56	83
Probably yes	20	21	10
Probably no	1	7	1
Definitely no	0	7	3
Hard to say	3	9	3

Source: \* Institute of Public Affairs

\*\* A PBS survey dated November 16-17, 2002 (N=1013). It should be noted that a CBOS poll taken a week earlier showed a smaller number of respondents declaring their intention to participate in the referendum (72% of the total).

Therefore, the parish clergy wanted to participate in the EU accession referendum at the same overwhelming rate as declared in 1998, but its support for integration was not as high as four years ago. Currently, 59% of the clergy is ready to support Poland's membership in the EU, i.e. 25 percentage points less than in 1998.

**Table 3.** Clergy support for Poland's integration with the European Union

(in %)

How will you vote in the referendum?	Clerics 1998*	Clerics 2002*	Overall population 2002**	University graduates 2002**
For Poland's accession to the European Union	84	59	68	80
Against Poland's accession to the European Union	6	20	18	12
Hard to say	10	21	14	8

Source: \* Institute of Public Affairs

\*\*PBS survey dated November 16-17, 2002 (N=1013). Above figures refer only to respondents declaring their intended participation in the referendum.

Support of integration was expressed by fewer clerics than university graduates and even fewer than Poles who declared their intention to participate in the referendum. The current level of the clergy's support of integration is comparable with the data for the overall population (according to CBOS, November 2002). This is a significant change in comparison with 1998, when the level of support among clerics was much higher than among the overall population.

Certain uncertainties about the current level of clerics' support of integration come from the fact that the latest survey had a larger proportion of unanswered questionnaires in the

main group than during the survey conducted in the late 1997 early 1998<sup>4</sup>. The large number of failed attempts to conduct interviews was caused by parish priests and vicars refusing to participate in the survey. The clergy refused to respond to the survey much more frequently than average Poles. As shown in pollster reports, some refusals ensued from clerics' or vicars' negative attitude toward the European Union. However, the reason for refusal evoked most often was the absence of the bishop's permission (pollsters could only present potential respondents with a letter stating that the Council of Polish Bishops had been informed of the survey) and lack of trust in public opinion polls.

It seems that there were three reasons for refusal. One stemmed from the unwillingness to reveal integration views incompatible with the official Church position. Another was a mistrust of public opinion polls and fear of manipulating the results of the survey. The third reason for clerics having a much more negative attitude toward the survey than four years ago could have been the political situation in which it was taking place. The previous survey had been conducted soon after the Jerzy Buzek government assumed office. In the opinion of many commentators, with the centre-right being in power, the Church was able to start treating the integration issue as one transcending political divisions and uniting all parties represented in the parliament at that time. The current situation may be more delicate in this respect and some clerics may fear that a survey showing their support of integration may entangle the Church in politics.

A lower level of enthusiasm for integration may have also ensued from the assessment of its impact on Poland and the Polish society, which will be discussed later in the report. It should be also stressed that in the latest survey, in contrast to four years ago, there was a perceptible connection between the frequency at which a respondent listened to *Radio Maryja* and his attitude to integration: the number of integration opponents was significantly higher among regular *Radio Maryja* listeners. Still, integration proponents dominated in all groups of *Radio Maryja* listeners. We have formulated the supposition that *Radio Maryja* may play a significant role in shaping clerics' attitude toward integration already in the previous report.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> See the chapter on the conduct of the survey in this report.

<sup>5</sup> See L. Kolarska-Bobińska, *Polska Eurodebata*, Institute of Public Affairs, Warsaw 1999, p. 42.

**Table 4.** Support of integration and listening to *Radio Maryja*

(in %)

Listening to <i>Radio Maryja</i>	How will you vote in the referendum?		
	For Poland's accession to the European Union	Against Poland's accession to the European Union	Hard to say
Total of clerics	59	20	21
Regular <i>Radio Maryja</i> listeners – daily / several times a week	53	24	23
Occasional <i>Radio Maryja</i> listeners – several times a month	63	13	24
Clerics who do not listen to <i>Radio Maryja</i>	65	16	19

Source: Institute of Public Affairs

The attitude to integration was also conditioned by factors such as the type of parish the respondent served (there was less support for integration and more undecided clerics in rural parishes), assessment of one's own financial situation (a high rate of support went hand in hand with a positive assessment of one's own financial situation) and his declared political views. In the latter case, the difference between responses provided by clerics holding right-wing/centrist views (strong support) and definitely right-wing views (weaker support) was fundamental. However, it needs to be noted that the number of integration proponents of Poland joining the EU was clearly higher than the number of opponents in all respondent categories. Also, the support of integration was weaker among *Nasz Dziennik* readers (50%) and much stronger among the readers of *Gazeta Wyborcza* (69%), *Catholic Information Agency Bulletin* (76%), *Więź* (88%) and *Tygodnik Powszechny* (82%).

The acceptance of the Polish membership in the EU was connected to the conviction that in our geo-political situation it was the only option benefiting Poland. This view was shared by 58% of surveyed clerics. Only opponents of Poland's membership in the EU considered that Poland would benefit the most by remaining neutral. That option was also relatively often selected by clerics who listened to *Radio Maryja* regularly. However, even they most often considered that integration with the EU was the best solution for the country.

**Table 5.** Strategic choice for Poland

(in %)

What in your opinion would be most beneficial for Poland's development?	Clerics 2002	Overall population 2000	University graduates 2000
Expanded economic and political relations with the U.S.A.	11	13	8
Joining the European Union	58	43	62
Closer cooperation with Russia	4	11	12
Staying neutral	16	21	12
Hard to say	11	12	6

Source: Institute of Public Affairs<sup>6</sup>**Table 6.** Strategic choice for Poland and listening to *Radio Maryja*

(in %)

Listening to <i>Radio Maryja</i>	What in your opinion would be most beneficial for Poland?			
	Joining the European Union	Staying a neutral country	Expanding economic and political relations with the U.S.A.	Closer cooperation with Russia
Total of respondents	58	16	11	4
Regular <i>Radio Maryja</i> listeners– daily / several times a week	49	22	11	4
Occasional <i>Radio Maryja</i> listeners – several times a month	68	10	7	9
Clerics who do not listen to <i>Radio Maryja</i>	65	10	12	3

Source: Institute of Public Affairs<sup>7</sup>

The "Hard to say" option was not provided.

The conviction that integration was the best solution for Poland owing to its geo-political situation was confirmed in responses to the question about the consequences of Poland not joining the European Union. Almost 60% of respondents considered it unfavourable and only 20% believed that it would not have any significant impact. As few as 8% of respondents believed that non-integration would benefit Poland. Significantly, even opponents of Poland's membership in the EU did not believe in benefits ensuing from not joining but only trivialized the impact of such scenario on Poland. One may even conclude

<sup>6</sup> See L. Kolarska-Bobińska, *Before the Great Change. Polish Public Opinion and EU Enlargement*, Institute of Public Affairs, Warsaw 2001. [www.isp.org.pl](http://www.isp.org.pl)

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

that those 8% represented the proportion of "hard-line" opponents to integration within the Polish clergy.

The support for or rejection of our membership in the EU may have been influenced by the emotional dimension of the attitude toward integration to at least the same extent as a cold calculation of profits and losses. Quantitative studies have a rather limited capability of defining the complexity of emotional attitudes but, nevertheless, can give a certain idea of the type of respondents' views on the issue under discussion. In the surveyed group, positive feelings (hope, curiosity and acceptance) prevailed over negative (apprehension, dislike, weariness or indifference).

**Table 7.** Emotional attitude toward Poland joining the EU

(in %)

What feelings does the phrase "Poland joining the European Union" evoke in you?*	Clerics 2002	Clerics who listen to <i>Radio Maryja</i> 2002		Overall population 2000	University graduates 2000
		Frequently	Rarely / never		
Hope	66	62	70	53	62
Apprehension	63	67	58	43	44
Curiosity	21	22	20	34	37
Acceptance	15	10	20	18	31
Dislike	7	8	7	15	8
Indifference	3	4	3	11	4
Weariness	4	4	4	5	3
<i>Hard to say, I do not know</i>	1	1	0	6	3
Each question could have several responses, hence the total exceeding 100%					

Source: Institute of Public Affairs

Clerics expressed their hopes associated with Poland joining the EU more often than the overall population but at the same time felt a greater amount of apprehension about it. As indicated by an in-depth analysis, clerics also believed that similar apprehension prevailed among their parishioners. Apprehension was expressed more often than hope by clerics with definitely right-wing views and those who listened to *Radio Maryja* regularly. Interestingly, neither of the two groups declared a strong dislike of integration and both also associated certain hopes therewith.

Apprehension was linked to forecasts of negative consequences of integration, particularly in the area of morals and customs<sup>8</sup>. This shows that the clergy's attitude toward integration is governed by conflicting emotions which may perpetuate their incertitude, particularly during the period leading to the referendum.

An important role in shaping the clergy's attitude toward integration is played by the position of the Council of Polish Bishops and Pope John Paul the Second. An overwhelming majority of surveyed clerics (80%) considered that the Council supported integration and a somewhat larger percentage (83%) believed that the Pope supported it as well.

Surveyed clerics were aware of the Pope's position on the integration issue to the same extent as four years ago, although the latest survey had fewer "Hard to say" responses. Therefore, a change in the clergy's attitude toward integration (i.e. less support than four years ago) was not associated with a change in the perception of the position of the Church leadership but with other factors. The activities of *Radio Maryja* (to which the clergy listened more often than in the past but was less influenced by its views) may have something to do with that. However, the clergy's understanding of the consequences of integration for Poland may be a more important factor.<sup>9</sup>

**Table 8.**

(in %)		
How do you understand the position of Pope John Paul the Second on Poland's integration with the EU? Does the Pope:	1998	2002
- supports Poland joining the EU wholeheartedly	26	29
- supports it moderately	56	53
- has not assumed a clear position on the issue	7	12
- is somewhat against it	1	1
- is definitely against it	0	1
Hard to say	10	4

Source: Institute of Public Affairs

Differences in opinion referred more to the extent of support than to support itself. For many proponents of integration that support was definite, whereas opponents considered its

<sup>8</sup> See the chapter *Consequences of integration for Poland*.

<sup>9</sup> See the chapter *Consequences of integration on Poland*.



nature less unequivocal (perhaps conditional). Ardent *Radio Maryja* listeners stated almost twice more often that the position of the Council and the Pope was uncertain, although even in this group there were more clerics who believed that both supported integration. This was also the opinion of more than one half of integration opponents, which means that clerics in this group have consciously assumed a different attitude on this issue than their superiors. On the other hand, the view that the Council and the Pope opposed integration found no supporters (in statistically significant numbers).

**Table 9.** Assessment of the Pope's position on European integration

(in %)

How do you think the Pope's position on Poland joining the European Union should be understood? Do you think that the Pope supports it?	All respondents	<i>Radio Maryja</i> listeners		Integration proponents	Integration opponents
		Listens often	Listens rarely / never		
Supports it wholeheartedly	29	21	38	33	7
Supports it moderately	53	57	48	62	47
Has not assumed a clear position on the issue	12	14	10	4	33
Is somewhat against it	1	2	0	0	4
Is definitely against it	1	1	0	0	0
Hard to say	4	5	4	1	9

Source: Institute of Public Affairs

**Table 10.** Assessment of the position of the Council of Polish Bishops on the issue of European integration

(in %)

How do you think the position of the Council of Polish Bishops on the issue of Poland joining the European Union should be understood? Do you think that the Council supports it?	All respondents	<i>Radio Maryja</i> listeners		Integration proponents	Integration opponents
		Listens often	Listens rarely / never		
Supports it wholeheartedly	22	16	28	33	7
Supports it moderately	58	58	58	62	47
Has not assumed a clear position on the issue	14	18	11	4	33
Is somewhat against it	2	2	0	0	4
Is definitely against it	0	0	0	0	0
Hard to say	4	6	3	1	9

Source: Institute of Public Affairs

A vast majority of surveyed clerics (81%) approved of the fact that the Council of Polish Bishops had assumed a position on the integration issue. What divided them was the extent of that approval. Clerics who served rural parishes and were less satisfied with their own financial status, as well as regular *Radio Maryja* listeners were much less approving of the Council having assumed a supportive position on integration than clerics who were better off, who were interested in politics, who listened to *Radio Maryja* rarely and who supported Poland joining the European Union.

**Table 11.** Assessment of the position of the Council of Polish Bishops on European integration (in %)


In your opinion, was it positive or negative that the Council of Polish Bishops assumed a position on Poland joining the European Union?	Clerics 2002	<i>Radio Maryja</i> listeners	
		Listens often	Listens rarely / never
Definitely positive	41	37	45
Somewhat positive	40	42	38
Somewhat negative	5	6	5
Definitely negative	2	2	2
<i>Hard to say</i>	12	13	10

Source: Institute of Public Affairs

Clergy views on the attitude of the Church to integration prior to the referendum seemed to be consistently subordinate to the principle of the Church having the right and obligation to assume a position on matters of importance to the country and the nation (which, obviously, applies to the issue of Poland joining the European Union). At the same time, surveyed clerics were reluctant to accept the notion of the Church or clergy becoming a party to a political discussion about the referendum. Only a minority believed that the Church should be instructing people how to vote and one third thought that convincing worshippers of their civic duty to vote – as it has done prior to parliamentary elections held in the past - was a proper thing for the Church to do. The most popular option suggested to the Church was to encourage worshippers to vote and familiarize them with Church views on the issue.

**Fig. 1** Church involvement in the referendum campaign

(in %)



Source: Institute of Public Affairs

The "Hard to know" option was not provided.

**Table 12.** Church involvement in the referendum campaign versus support for Poland joining the EU and listening to *Radio Maryja*

(in %)

How should the Church behave during the period leading to the accession referendum?	Proponents of accession to the EU	<i>Radio Maryja</i> listeners	
		Listens often	Listens rarely / never
Should limit itself to encouraging worshippers to vote in the referendum	34	33	35
Should be encouraging worshippers to vote and publicly announce its position on accession	44	39	44
Should present its position on accession and instruct worshippers to vote accordingly	17	19	16
Should not pronounce itself on this issue at all	4	7	4
<i>Hard to say</i>	1	2	1

Source: Institute of Public Affairs


It seems that this option is also the most logical because once we accept that the Church has the right and obligation to take a stand on this issue we can hardly refuse it the right to present it to worshippers. This attitude results from a certain philosophy about the presence of the Church in public life which has developed in Poland during often stormy debates and arguments of the 1990s. It is expressed in responses to questions about the

preferred manner of the Church's presence in public life and views on democracy, which were discussed in the preceding chapter. We have already established that more than one half of respondents did not approve of attempts to instruct worshippers how to vote. The response was less unequivocal when it came to discussing the possibility of lobbying the government: more than one third of respondents had no objections. We can assume that, in matters of key importance to the teaching of the Church, the clergy would not want to give up totally the possibility of having some bearing on the integration policy.

Also, the fact that a majority of surveyed clerics (61%) did not consider that the clergy should be appearing publicly with politicians in the referendum campaign may be treated as an expression of their reluctance to put the Church authority in the service of making a political choice such as casting a vote in the referendum. Views on this subject were positively correlated with respondents' declared political preferences. Clerics with moderately right-wing views considered more often that the clergy and politicians should not be speaking on integration with the same voice, whereas definitely right-wing views went hand in hand with a rejection of this type of practices. It is possible that some clerics were uncomfortable with the idea of a left-wing government taking Poland to the European Union.

**Fig. 2.** Church and politicians in the referendum campaign

**Do you consider it proper for official representatives of the Church to appear publicly with politicians in the referendum campaign?**



Source: Institute of Public Affairs

On the integration issue, clerics supported certain forms of Church involvement, mainly that associated with disseminating the Church position. They gave the smallest amount of support to forms of involvement that could be perceived as verging on politics – associated with propagandizing the idea of integration or agitating on its behalf. Consequently, almost two thirds of the surveyed clergy believed that the Church should issue a pastoral letter to worshippers on the issue of integration, whereas few clerics accepted forms of involvement such as taking up this issue in sermons, organizing press conferences or making integration materials accessible in churches.

**Table 13.** Desired forms of presenting the Church position on integration

(in %)

Which methods of presenting the Church position on Poland joining the European Union do you consider most appropriate? Indicate no more than three.	All respondents	Integration supporters	Integration opponents	Frequent listeners to <i>Radio Maryja</i>
Issuing a pastoral letter to worshippers	62	63	60	65
Publishing appropriate documents, making statements on TV, radio, in the press	36	36	27	36
Issuing a national proclamation of the Council of Polish Bishops	34	36	31	33
Presentations on TV, radio and in the press by Church representatives	31	31	27	34
Activities via Catholic organisations and associations	31	10	10	9
Organizing meetings on integration in parishes	24	14	12	13
Disseminating appropriate materials in churches	14	3	7	3
Press conferences	9	23	28	23
Including the integration issue in sermons at parishes	4	34	28	25
Other forms	2	1	3	2
Hard to say	1	0	4	2
Several answers could be given, hence the total exceeding 100%				

Source: Institute of Public Affairs

Nevertheless, surveyed clerics remained sceptical about the influence of the Church position on the attitude of their parishioners. They considered that it would affect only a small minority.

**Table 14.** Assessment of the influence of the Church position toward integration on worshippers  
(in %)

Do you believe that your parishioners will be guided by the Church position toward integration?	All respondents	Integration proponents	Integration opponents
Most will	14	17	14
Some will and others will not	59	61	56
Most will not	17	14	21
Hard to say	10	8	9

Source: Institute of Public Affairs

This scepticism is largely justified considering that more than 70% of Polish citizens declared being able to make up their mind about integration without anybody's help and only less than 2% believed that the opinion of their parish priest would have a significant impact on their decision. For the sake of comparison, even fewer respondents (approximately 61%) believed that such impact could be exerted on them by local leaders (e.g. village or town administrators), whereas politicians' opinions mattered to 6% of the population. Although these assessments seem to largely underestimate the actual impact of the elites on societal opinions, they nevertheless indicate that the clergy's reluctance to become involved in direct forms of propagandizing integration is based on rational assumptions and that such type of involvement may cause more harm than good. This conclusion seems to be supported by the IPSOS/Demoskop survey, which indicates that a majority of Poles (approximately 60%) does not consider appropriate for the Church to assume a position on this issue.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>10</sup> See the results of the PBS survey of November 16-17, 2002, and *Monitor Integracji Europejskiej* No. 54 – a special issue entitled *Spoleczne aspekty integracji Polski z Unią Europejską*, p. 181. In the Demoskop survey, the manner in which the question is phrased may be a cause of some concern since it does not differentiate between the assessment of the fact of the Church taking a position on integration and the assessment of the content of that position, which might have significantly increased the percentage of respondents critically assessing the involvement of the bishops in the integration issue.

## Referendum campaign in the opinion of the clergy

The approaching date of the referendum on Poland joining the European Union gives relevance to the issue of the role that the Church and the clergy may play in the pre-referendum campaign. From this perspective, it is important to find out whether clerics intend to be actively involved (during the time separating us from the referendum) and what is their opinion on the attitude to integration in their parish.

The advance of accession negotiations into their decisive phase have brought the issues associated with accession into the forefront of Polish public life. The growth of popular interest in integration has followed closely<sup>11</sup>. Observations by the parish clergy confirms that phenomenon. Surveyed clerics indicated that more than one half of their parishioners was interested in integration issues, which was much more than in 1998. However, it should be stressed that clerics surveyed this time perceived their parishioners' apprehension with respect to integration much more often than four years ago. Another interesting finding is that twice more clerics than in the preceding survey declared not being aware of their parishioners' attitude toward integration.

**Table 1.** Perception of parishioners' views on integration

	(in %)	
What views do your parishioners have on Poland's integration with the European Union? Are most of them:	1998	2002
- interested in integration	36	56
- uninterested in integration	45	20
I do not know, hard to say	19	24
- support integration	32	26
- oppose integration	10	17
- are indifferent to integration	42	24
I do not know, hard to say	16	33
- are apprehensive about integration	37	56
- place high hopes in integration	32	23
I do not know, hard to say	31	21

Source: Institute of Public Affairs

<sup>11</sup> According to CBOS studies conducted in October 2002, two thirds of the Polish population were interested in the issue of Poland joining the European Union. See the CBOS communiqué *Integracja Polski z Unią Europejską - zainteresowanie i poinformowanie*, November 2002.

Apprehension was perceived predominantly by clerics serving rural parishes (63% declared their parishioners' fear of integration, whereas 19% stated that their parishioners placed high hopes therein) and mixed urban/rural parishes (58% and 24% respectively), but among clerics serving urban parishes there were also more of those who perceived fear of integration among their parishioners (40% and 33% respectively).

The perception of parishioners' attitude toward integration turned out to be closely associated with the respondent's personal attitude to Poland joining the EU. Clerics who opposed integration very rarely admitted that their parishioners supported it. At the same time, they were precisely the ones who very often stressed that their parishioners feared integration and much more often than integration proponents stated that they did not know whether their parishioners were for or against it. Perhaps in some cases respondents were reluctant to admit that there was a difference of opinion on integration between them and their parishioners. On the other hand, neither reading *Nasz Dziennik* nor listening to *Radio Maryja* affected opinions on this issue.

**Table 2.** Personal attitude toward integration and opinions about parishioners' views on that issue (in %)

What are your parishioners' views on Poland's integration with the EU? Are most of them:	Attitude of surveyed clerics toward Poland's integration with the EU		
	Supporters	Opponents	Undecided
- for integration	39	6	13
- against integration	11	28	25
- indifferent to integration	22	25	24
I do not know, hard to say	28	41	38
- apprehensive of integration	49	70	60
- placing high hopes in integration	33	9	13
I do not know, hard to say	18	21	27
- interested in integration	63	50	46
- not interested in integration	20	18	22
I do not know, hard to say	17	32	32
N=	338	113	124

Source: Institute of Public Affairs



Such proximity between the attitude of surveyed clerics toward integration and their opinions on the dominant attitude in the community they served cannot help but lead one to suppose that at least in a certain proportion of cases we are dealing here with the projection mechanism, i.e. ascribing one's own opinions to others.

Most clerics (63%) rejected the possibility of disseminating materials about integration within the church perimeter. Personal attitude toward integration had very little impact on that position. Clerics without a clear attitude toward integration believed more often than integration proponents or opponents that such materials should not be handed out in churches. The conviction that churches were not appropriate places for this type of activity was definitely predominant in both urban and rural parishes.

**Table 3.** Attitude toward integration and opinions on the dissemination of integration information materials in churches

(in %)

Do you believe that various materials informing about integration should be disseminated in churches?	Attitude toward integration			
	All respondents	Supporters	Opponents	Undecided
Definitely yes	7	6	12	4
Possibly yes	28	32	28	23
<b>Total yes</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>27</b>
Possibly no	34	33	30	36
Definitely no	29	28	27	31
<b>Total no</b>	<b>63</b>	<b>61</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>67</b>
Hard to say	2	1	3	6

Source: Institute of Public Affairs

Clerics who were in favour of the dissemination of integration materials in churches were almost unanimous in believing that the Church should remain unbiased and allow dissemination of such materials by both supporters and opponents of integration. This opinion was shared by 92% of the group. On the other hand, 6% were in favour of disseminating only pro-integration materials in churches and 1% - only materials against integration.

Clerics who considered that integration materials should be disseminated in churches were asked to list topics which their parishioners would find most interesting and relevant. Issues most often mentioned were associated with the situation of Polish agriculture after

integration (39%), impact of integration on unemployment, possibilities of finding work in the EU (27%), benefits of integration (23%) and the cost and threats associated with integration (21%). In the opinion of clerics who worked in rural areas (i.e. rural and mixed urban/rural parishes), the most important issue was the situation of Polish agriculture after integration. They also stressed the need to provide that information in a clear, compact and trustworthy manner. Clerics who worked in urban parishes listed many more subjects with the potential of interesting their parishioners. Issues mentioned most often were associated with the impact of integration on the labour market. Note should be taken of the relatively frequently stated requirement in the urban environment (by clerics from urban and mixed urban/rural parishes) for information not only about the impact of integration on Poland but about the European Union *per sé*.

**Table 4.** Most needed information listed mentioned by respondents

(in %)

What types of information would be most interesting and needed in your parish?	Total (N=209)	Parishes		
		Urban (N=48)	Mixed urban/rural (N=53)	Rural (N=109)
Situation of Polish agriculture after integration	39	2	40	54
Impact of integration on the unemployment level, possibilities and terms of working in the EU	27	30	25	25
Benefits of integration	23	16	34	21
Cost and threats of integration	21	23	29	16
Situation of Polish economy after integration	18	18	21	17
Information about the EU	17	29	22	9
Impact of integration on material well-being	9	18	5	6
Future of Polish youth in the EU	5	6	3	5
Impact of integration on the educational system	5	4	4	5
Impact of integration on social services	4	9	3	3
Role and significance of Poland in the EU	4	7	7	1
Impact of integration on the Polish national identity, traditions	3	2	5	2
Statements concerning the nature of information: short, specific, clear, trustworthy	12	2	20	13
Subjects indicated by less than 3% of respondents were omitted. Respondents could indicate several answers, hence the total not equalling 100.				

Source: Institute of Public Affairs

Information about integration and its impact may come from various more or less accessible and, from the point of view of its recipients, reliable sources. Surveyed clerics believed that the duty to inform the population about integration and its consequences should rest first and foremost with the mass media (79%), possibly because of their universal accessibility. Specialized government-appointed institutions were mentioned relatively often (45%), followed by local self-governments (35%). European Union agencies based in Poland and scientific institutions/schools were mentioned less frequently (26% each). One respondent in five believed that information about integration should be provided by the Church and associated organizations. Parliamentarians were mentioned somewhat less often (17%).

Clerics' opinions about most desirable information sources meshed to a large degree with those of lay university graduates<sup>12</sup>, albeit with a few exceptions. Clerics much more frequently indicated the Church and associated organizations, as well as local self-governments, as independent sources of information, and less frequently EU agencies and the mass media.

**Table 5.** Preferred institutions informing about integration – national sample and clerics

(in %)

What should be the main sources of popular information about integration with the EU and its consequences?	Clerics 2002	Overall population 2001	University graduates 2001
Mass media	79	84	88
Government institutions (e.g. government-appointed European information centres)	45	31	46
Local self-governments	35	21	17
European Union agencies in Poland	26	15	36
Scientific institutions / schools	26	19	21
Church and associated organizations	20	6	3
Parliamentarians	17	9	12
Agricultural chambers and agricultural consultancy centres	9	9	7
Professional associations and organizations	7	4	4
Political parties	4	5	7
Trade unions	4	4	3
Hard to say	0	7	3
Several answers could be provided to each question, hence the total exceeding 100%			

Source: Institute of Public Affairs

<sup>12</sup> B. Roguska, M. Strzeszewski, *Zainteresowanie społeczne, wiedza i poinformowanie o integracji Polski z Unią Europejską*, Institute of Public Affairs, Warsaw 2002.

The fact that clerics mentioned the Church and associated organizations as a source of information much more frequently than the overall population is understandable. What is not clear is why clerics pointed much more often (twice more frequently than university graduates) at local self-governments as a preferred information source. It is perhaps because parish priests were "up on local issues" by the nature of the role they played in the community. Another reason may be the time at which the survey was conducted – directly after the elections to local self-governments. The elections have undoubtedly drawn more attention to and interest in self-governments, also among clerics.

**Table 6.** Preferred institutional sources of information about integration and support for Poland joining the EU

(in %)

What should be the main sources of popular information about integration with the EU and its consequences?	Attitude toward integration			
	Total	Supporters	Opponents	Undecided
Mass media	79	87	62	79
Government institutions (e.g. government-appointed European information centres)	45	49	38	41
Local self-governments	35	35	31	37
European Union agencies in Poland	26	31	18	22
Scientific institutions / schools	26	24	29	30
Church and associated organizations	20	19	26	17
Parliamentarians	17	15	18	19
Agricultural chambers and agricultural consultancy centres	9	6	15	8
Professional associations and organizations	7	5	11	7
Political parties	4	3	7	3
Trade unions	4	3	7	5
Several answers could be provided, hence the total exceeding 100%				

Source: Institute of Public Affairs

The opinion concerning institutions that were most appropriate for informing the society about integration and its consequences turned out to be somewhat linked to the personal attitude toward integration. Integration opponents undoubtedly look at European Union agencies in Poland, the mass media and specialized government institutions as information sources devoid of objectivity with respect to integration matters and, consequently, pointed at them as appropriate much less frequently than integration supporters.

Characteristically, the attitude toward EU agencies in Poland and government institutions among respondents undecided about integration approximated that of integration opponents. On the issue of the mass media, the undecided held a view closer to that of integration supporters.

Finally, it should be added that clerics who were regular *Radio Maryja* listeners pointed at the mass media and EU agencies in Poland as preferred information sources less frequently than non-listeners, and pointed somewhat more frequently than non-listeners at the Church and associated organizations.

**Table 7.** Preferred government institutions informing about integration and listening to *Radio Maryja* (in %)

What should be the main sources of popular information about integration with the EU and its consequences?	Total	Listening to <i>Radio Maryja</i> daily or several times a week	Never listening to <i>Radio Maryja</i>
Mass media	79	75	85
Government institutions (e.g. government-appointed European information centres)	45	44	44
Local self-governments	35	36	34
European Union agencies in Poland	26	24	31
Scientific institutions / schools	26	24	29
Church and associated organizations	20	22	17
Several answers could be provided, hence the total exceeding 100%			

Source: Institute of Public Affairs

The role which parish priests could play in the referendum campaign was not limited to making the parish church available for the dissemination of integration materials. An indirect indication of the extent to which parishioners expected their priest's or vicar's involvement in the issue may be found in the responses to the question on whether parishioners had been asking the respondent about integration, solicited information, asked for clarifications, shared their doubts. A majority of respondents (60%) stated that such conversations had happened but, in their words, "rather rarely" (23%) or "very rarely" (21%). Only one respondent in seven (16%) described them as "quite frequent". Church-goers spoke about these matters more often with parish priests (19%) than with vicars (12%)<sup>13</sup>. It is worth

<sup>13</sup> The reason for this may be that vicars' duties are focused on ministering to the youth and teaching religion in schools.

noting that the response "[Parishioners] never turn to me with these issues" was provided by clerics serving in both rural and urban parish communities and by both supporters and opponents of integration.

One respondent in four (24%) participated in a meeting, seminar or training session devoted to issues associated with Poland joining the European Union. Vicars participated more often (29%) than parish priests (19%) and they were usually young – under 35 years of age (33% of that group). They came somewhat more frequently from mixed urban/rural parishes (26%) rather than from rural parishes (22%). Among those who attended such meetings were as many supporters of integration as its opponents. Clerics who attended integration seminars or training were much more inclined to take up the subject with their parishioners (to be exact, they responded more often that their parishioners turned to them with these issues).

**Table 8.** Participation in integration meetings, seminars and training sessions versus speaking about integration with parishioners

(in %)

Have you ever participated in a meeting, seminar or training session devoted to Poland's integration with the EU?	Do parishioners turn to you with their doubts about integration, ask for clarifications, information, etc.?		
	Often	Rarely or very rarely	Never
Yes	25	46	29
No	12	44	44

Source: Institute of Public Affairs

In the latest survey, one in nine respondents (11%) was involved in activities associated with the forthcoming accession referendum, whereas the next 18% intended to become involved prior to the referendum date. Clerics who were already involved pointed at three types of activities: encouraging parish associations and organizations to initiate discussions on integration issues, initiating individual talks on the subject with parishioners and disseminating the cult of European patrons.

Other activities consisted in making various integration materials accessible to parishioners. This was done either by distributing brochures or fliers out of the church kiosk or spreading them out at the church entrance and encouraging parishioners to read them, or by posting texts, press clippings, etc. in display cases on church grounds. Their intent to refer to integration in sermons was mentioned less often.

**Table 9.** Types of activities taken up in connection with the accession referendum

(in %)

Do you personally take up any activities associated with the forthcoming integration referendum?	Percentage of responses among:	
	All surveyed clerics	Clerics taking up activities
Encouraging parish associations and organizations to discuss the subject	22	76
Initiating talks on the subject with parishioners	22	75
Disseminating the cult of European patrons	22	75
Making various integration materials available to parishioners	12	41
Posting texts on integration in display cases	10	33
Making reference to the subject in sermons	8	28
Other	8	29
Several responses could be given, hence the total exceeding 100%		

Source: Institute of Public Affairs

Respondents who declared a high level of interest in politics were most actively involved with integration issues.

**Table 10.** Interest in politics and taking up activities associated with the referendum

(in %)

Interest in politics	Do you personally take up any activities associated with the forthcoming integration referendum?			
	Yes	No but I intend to	No and I do not intend to	Hard to say
Total	11	18	63	8
High	17	21	53	9
Medium	8	17	67	8
Low or none	6	16	73	5

Source: Institute of Public Affairs

Various types of activities associated with Poland's accession to the EU were taken up much more frequently by integration supporters than its opponents. According to the latest survey, such activities were being taken up by 13% of integration supporters and the next 24% intended to take them up in the near future. Meanwhile, among integration opponents, 9% of respondents were already involved in these activities and a further 11% declared their intention to take them up before the referendum. Therefore, it may be assumed that some clerics personally opposed to integration refrained from taking up activities associated therewith because by acting in accordance with their convictions they would collide with the

official position of the Church. It is also possible that, in some cases, clerics opposed to integration concealed their activities for the same reason.

Activities associated with the approaching referendum were more often taken up by clerics who had attended various meetings, seminars or training sessions on integration. The truth might be that, on one hand, these meetings attracted clerics who were more interested in politics and felt the need to act, and, on the other hand, that they stimulated such interest. Besides, their participants felt that they were better prepared to take on integration activities.

**Table 11.** Attendance at meetings, seminars and training sessions on integration and taking up activities associated with the referendum

(in %)

Have you ever attended a meeting, seminar or training session devoted to Poland's integration with the EU?	Do you personally take up any activities associated with the forthcoming integration referendum?		
	Yes or I intend to	No and I do not intend to	Hard to say
Yes	39	53	8
No	26	67	7

Source: Institute of Public Affairs

All in all, survey results indicate that the attitude of the clergy to taking up activities associated with the referendum on Poland's accession to the European Union is rather moderate although it cannot be said that there is no interest whatsoever – close to one third of respondents had or intended to take up some type of activity associated with the approaching accession referendum. A majority of respondents believed that materials informing about integration should not be disseminated within the church perimeter and an even larger proportion had not and did not intend to take up any such activity. This also referred to clerics who supported integration in accordance with the official Church position. More than one half of this group had not and did not intend to take up any activity associated with the referendum. Nevertheless, close to a quarter of respondents had participated in integration meetings, seminars or training sessions. Such participation was conducive to assuming an interest in the subject and talking about it with parishioners.

Parish priests themselves declared that they would play a more important role in influencing parishioners prior to the accession referendum than vicars. This is because they more often initiated integration-related conversations with parishioners and the latter were more inclined to turn to them with these issues. It was a natural consequence of the position



and authority of parish priests in the community. Also, parish priests made integration materials more often available to worshippers. This probably also ensued from their official position – in general, they were the ones who decided on these matters. Vicars were only somewhat more influential than parish priests through parish associations and organizations under their care.

## Perception of the European Union

The image itself of the European Union is a significant factor in influencing attitudes on integration. The 1998 survey showed a clear discrepancy among the Polish clergy between the perceived and postulated nature of that organization. Respondents defined the EU as a mainly economic and political community, but expected it to evolve into a union of countries based principally on the acceptance and implementation of common values. In the latest survey, respondents indicated that these expectations had not been met. Indeed, the perception of the European Union as an organization acting pursuant to its members' joint interests rather than common values has solidified during the better part of the past five years. While in January 1998 close to 75% of respondents believed that the EU countries were united more by common interests than values, in the latest survey that opinion was shared already by as many as 84% of the parish clergy. One priest in ten considered that the EU countries were linked to one another by both values and interests, whereas only one in twenty pointed at values as the foundation of that organization. Joint interests of the EU states were mentioned more often by integration opponents (95%) than supporters (78%).

**Table 1.** Nature of the European Union

(in %)		
Are the EU countries linked by common values or by interests?	1998	2002
Values	5	5
Interests	74	84
Both	19	10
Hard to say	2	1

Source: Institute of Public Affairs

The economic functioning of the European Union is based on the premise that the existence of a common market benefits all its members. Apprehensions about an unbalanced distribution of membership benefits may lead to questioning the meaning of integration in general. This is why the consolidation of the perception that the European Union takes care first and foremost of the interests of its richest members is particularly alarming. In 1998, this opinion was shared by 41% of surveyed clerics, now it is shared already by more than one half (52%). At the same time, the proportion of respondents considering that the EU took equal care of the economic interests of all its members fell from 47% to 34%.

The opinion that integration benefited first and foremost the richest countries was expressed most often by clerics older than 50 (67%), those declaring a vivid interest in

politics (58%) and regular *Radio Maryja* listeners (63%). It was shared much more often by opponents to Poland joining the EU (73%) and clerics undecided how they would vote in the accession referendum (63%) than by integration supporters (40%). Supporters of Poland's membership in the EU considered most often (49%) that the organization took equal care of the economic interests of all its members.

**Table 2.** Benefits of integration to countries at various stages of economic development

(in %)

The European Union is made up of countries at various stage of economic development. Do you think that the European Union:	1998	2002
Takes care first and foremost of the interests of its richest members	41	52
Takes care first and foremost of the interests of its poorest members	3	2
Takes equal care of the interests of all its members	47	34
Hard to say	9	12

Source: Institute of Public Affairs

One of the arguments advanced by opponents of European integration was the threat to the vitality of national cultures associated with that process. Clerics did not and do not share that type of apprehensions. On the contrary, in the past few years they have been more convinced than ever that the European Union created conditions propitious to the development of national cultures. This opinion is currently shared by close to three quarters of the clergy.

**Table 3.** Conditions for the development of national cultures in the EU

(in %)

Do you consider that the EU provides appropriate setting for the development of national cultures?	1998	2002
Definitely yes	18	22
To some extent yes	51	51
To some extent no	20	13
Definitely no	4	5
Hard to say	7	9

Source: Institute of Public Affairs

It is worth noting that this opinion was also shared by a majority of clerics who declared holding definitely right-wing political views (70%) and a majority of regular *Radio Maryja* listeners (70%).

Opinions on this matter were perceptively differentiated by the attitude to integration. An overwhelming majority of its supporters (86%) considered that the European Union provided conditions for the development of national cultures. Accession opponents disagreed more often (50%) than agreed (40%).

Consequently, the clergy's apprehensions stemmed out of their conviction about an economic inequality between rich and poor EU countries rather than about the EU threatening the development of national cultures.

To date, religious issues were practically beyond the scope of interest of the European Union and very little consideration was given to them in EU legislation<sup>14</sup>. Consequently, certain groups are now calling for the need to include religious issues in the future European constitution, the foundations of which are being built by the European Convention. This issue was very significant to the surveyed clergy. They considered as particularly important for the constitution to refer to Europe's Christian roots, promote Christian values and recognize the individual and collective right to religious freedom. Clerics were only a little less insistent on the constitution including *Invocatio Dei* and recognition of the Church as a subject of European law.

**Table 4.** Postulates concerning the content of the European constitution

(in %)

A document described as the European constitution is currently under work. How important is it for the constitution to include:	Very important	Somewhat important	Not very important	Practically unimportant	Hard to say
- Reference to Europe's Christian roots, promotion of Christian values	88	11	1	1	1
- Recognition of the individual and collective right to religious freedom	86	12	0	0	2
- <i>Invocatio Dei</i>	76	20	2	1	1
- Recognition of the Church institution as a subject of European law	65	24	4	2	5

Source: Institute of Public Affairs

<sup>14</sup> Except for the declaration on the status of churches and non-confessional organizations added to the Treaty of Amsterdam in June 1997: "The European Union respects and does not prejudice the status under national law of churches and religious associations or communities in the Member States. The European Union equally respects the status of philosophical and non-confessional organisations."

All in all, in the opinion of Polish clerics, the European Union has been and remains a predominantly economic community. At the same time, a significantly higher proportion of surveyed clerics than a few years ago believed that the economic benefits of integration were reserved mainly for the richest EU members. Economic aspects of the functioning of the European Union aroused more apprehension among the surveyed clergy than issues associated with maintaining a cultural diversity. In their opinion, the European Union should be more of a community of values. They were overwhelmingly in support of the inclusion of references to religion in the future European constitution.

## Consequences of integration for Poland

The perception of current relations between Poland and the European Union, and of future consequences of Poland's membership in the EU has deteriorated significantly in the past few years. Clerics' opinions have undergone changes similar to those among the overall population. However, despite the deterioration - at times very significant - of the opinion on integration, clerics continued to show more optimism with respect to the majority of issues concerning the EU membership than the overall population.

Directly before the start of accession negotiations, clerics most often described relations between Poland and the European Union as equally beneficial to both sides. Today, more than one half is of the opinion that they benefit mainly the European Union. This assessment is in step with the opinion held by a majority of Poles, including a large proportion of university graduates, who are among the greatest supporters of Poland's accession to the EU.

The conviction that relations between Poland and the EU benefit mostly the EU member-states was most often expressed by older clerics (aged 50 and up), serving rural parishes, declaring a vivid interest in politics, holding definitely right-wing views and listening to *Radio Maryja* regularly.

**Table 1.** Assessment of current relations between Poland and the European Union

(in %)

How do you assess current relations between Poland and the EU? Who benefits from them more?	Clerics*		Overall population **	University graduates **
	1998	2002	2002	2002
European Union	33	51	59	50
Poland	12	8	5	11
Equally – Poland and the EU	41	25	19	30
Nobody	6	6	-	-
Hard to say	8	10	17	9

Source: \* Institute of Public Affairs

\*\* CBOS

The perception of the current Polish/EU relations was linked to the attitude toward integration. Opinions expressed by integration opponents were definitely critical: 78% believed that the EU countries were main beneficiaries of these relations. Integration supporters were also far from being satisfied with the current state of the Polish/EU relations.

The issue of Poland's position in united Europe also evoked more apprehension now than before the start of accession negotiations. A second-class membership was feared by 61% of respondents, including a large majority of integration opponents (87%) and almost one half (47%) of its supporters. It is noteworthy that clerics worried less about the future status of Poland in the European Union than the overall population.

**Table 2.** Opinions on Poland's future position in the European Union

(in %)

Will Poland after joining the European Union become:	Clerics		Overall population
	1998	2002	2000
- a truly equal member, like the other EU states	34	27	22
- a second-class member, weaker and disadvantaged	54	61	67
Hard to say	12	12	11

Source: Institute of Public Affairs

One of important issues for the public opinion, including clerics, is the financial outcome of integration. Before the start of accession negotiations, more than one half of surveyed clerics expressed their hope that both sides would cover equitably the expense of Poland joining the EU. The prevalent opinion today is that most of the financial cost of joining the EU will need to be covered by Poland. Clerics who declared having definitely right-wing views and regular *Radio Maryja* listeners were particularly often in agreement with that opinion.

**Table 3.** Spreading the financial cost of integration

(w %)

Who will bear most of the financial cost of Poland joining the European Union?	1998	2002
Poland	39	46
European Union	3	5
Both sides equally	53	39
Hard to say	5	10

Source: Institute of Public Affairs

However, the financial burden associated with integration should be compensated with assistance received from the EU. In the opinion of two thirds of surveyed clerics, Poland will need the EU financial assistance (and in the opinion of some respondents, it will need this assistance desperately).

Opinions on these two issues separated supporters and opponents of integration, and the divergence was more pronounced on the issue of the importance of EU assistance to Poland. One half of integration supporters (51%) believed that the cost of integration would be shared equally by both sides. At the same time, an overwhelming majority of these respondents (81%) expected EU to provide Poland with significant financial assistance. Opponents to integration thought most often (66%) that Poland would have to pay the bulk of the accession cost and that financial assistance from the EU would be of no more than moderate significance to Poland (57%).

**Table 4.** Assessment of the expected EU financial assistance

(in %)

How important will financial assistance from the European Union be to Poland?	
- Very important	22
- Important	44
- Not very important	20
- Unimportant	5
Hard to say	9

Source: Institute of Public Affairs

At the end of accession negotiations, the clergy's expectations (hopes) associated with integration were, generally speaking, visibly lower than at their outset. Therefore, there has either been a certain disenchantment with the idea of integration among clerics during the better part of the past five years or they mitigated their earlier excessive expectations.

While surveyed clerics, similarly to the overall population, were moderate optimists with respect to the consequences of integration for Poland, they were more sceptical when it came to assessing integration's potential benefits to the Church. In addition, they had trouble assessing unequivocally whether they and their parishioners would profit or lose out on integration. Only 17% of clerics considered that Poland's membership in the European Union would be more beneficial to them personally than harmful. According to the CBOS survey of the overall population conducted last year, there were twice more respondents, including almost thrice more university graduates, who expected a positive impact of integration on their lives. Consequently, the discrepancy in the clergy's responses concerning their personal expectations and those of the public at large was particularly significant.



**Table 5.** General opinions about the consequences of integration

(in %)

Will Poland's integration with the European Union bring [...] more advantages or disadvantages?	Clerics*		Overall population **	University graduates **
	1998	2002	2001	2001
to Poland				
More advantages than disadvantages	49	<b>38</b>	40	57
More disadvantages than advantages	7	<b>18</b>	19	18
As many advantages as disadvantages	31	<b>31</b>	30	20
Hard to say	13	<b>13</b>	11	5
to the Catholic Church in Poland				
More advantages than disadvantages	23	<b>15</b>	-	-
More disadvantages than advantages	19	<b>27</b>	-	-
As many advantages as disadvantages	37	<b>37</b>	-	-
Hard to say	21	<b>21</b>	-	-
to you personally				
More advantages than disadvantages	25	<b>17</b>	34	47
More disadvantages than advantages	6	<b>10</b>	21	13
As many advantages as disadvantages	36	<b>41</b>	23	28
Hard to say	33	<b>32</b>	22	12
to a majority of your parishioners				
More advantages than disadvantages	-	<b>26</b>	-	-
More disadvantages than advantages	-	<b>20</b>	-	-
As many advantages as disadvantages	-	<b>29</b>	-	-
Hard to say	-	<b>25</b>	-	-

Source: \* Institute of Public Affairs

\*\* CBOS

Opinions on the consequences of integration differed first and foremost in accordance with respondents' age, declared political views and the frequency of listening to *Radio Maryja*. The most pessimistic in their forecasts (consistently in all four assessment dimensions) were older clerics, aged over 50, who declared definitely right-wing political views and were regular *Radio Maryja* listeners.

Opinions on the consequences of integration were also closely linked to clerics' attitude toward our membership in the European Union, which was expressed in their declarations on voting in the accession referendum. It turned out that clerics' attitude toward integration was linked before all else to the assessment of the consequences of integration on Poland (Kendall's Tau  $b = 0,52$ ), to a lesser degree on the Church (Kendall's Tau  $b = 0,37$ ), on parishioners (Kendall's Tau  $b = 0,37$ ) and on clerics themselves (Kendall's Tau  $b = 0,35$ ). Consequently, in their support of Poland's membership in the European Union, clerics were mainly guided by their conviction that integration would be beneficial to Poland.

Clerics' opinions on the consequences of integration on individual aspects of life had also deteriorated in the past four years. Still, the hope for an improvement of the situation in many aspects of life remained high, often higher than among the overall population and approximating that of university graduates, who were relatively most optimistic in the forecast of the consequences of Poland joining the European Union. Clerics expected first and foremost an improvement of Poland's external security and a positive civilizing influence of integration, such as bettering of the environmental condition, improved law abidance and development of democracy and civic freedoms. Hence, these expectations were of a political nature. An overwhelming majority also expected socio-economic improvements: growth of enterprise, better economic conditions, lower unemployment, better living conditions. It is worth noting that, as in the case of the overall population, clerics' hope for a lower unemployment after Poland's accession to the EU was now declared more often than a few years ago despite a lower level of optimism with respect to integration consequences. Clerics and others feared that integration would have a bad effect on the functioning of agriculture.

However, the parish clergy was most concerned with the religiosity and morals of the population. These concerns have even deepened in the past few years. More than one half of surveyed clerics considered that integration would harm the religiosity of the population and close to two thirds believed that it would also harm the durability of Polish families. On these

issues particularly important to the Church, in contrast to the opinions about the consequences of integration on other aspects of life, clerics were more pessimistic than the overall population including university graduates.

In addition, a majority of clerics expected that morals in Poland would become freer as a result of Poland joining the European Union.

**Table 6.** Opinions on the consequences of integration on selected aspects of life

(in %)

Will Poland's integration with the EU have a positive or negative effect on:	Clerics*		Overall population **	University graduates **
	1998	2002	2002	2002
Poland's external security				
Rather positive	92	<b>80</b>	-	-
Rather negative	3	<b>5</b>	-	-
No effect	3	<b>8</b>	-	-
Hard to say	2	<b>7</b>	-	-
Development of democracy and civic freedoms in Poland				
Rather positive	85	<b>71</b>	-	-
Rather negative	5	<b>10</b>	-	-
No effect	5	<b>9</b>	-	-
Hard to say	5	<b>10</b>	-	-
Law abidance in Poland				
Rather positive	84	<b>71</b>	49	66
Rather negative	5	<b>11</b>	12	5
No effect	6	<b>9</b>	21	23
Hard to say	5	<b>9</b>	18	6
Reforming and modernizing political and economic structures				
Rather positive	88	<b>64</b>	-	-
Rather negative	3	<b>11</b>	-	-
No effect	3	<b>11</b>	-	-
Hard to say	6	<b>14</b>	-	-
Polish economy				
Rather positive	-	<b>62</b>	47	67
Rather negative	-	<b>23</b>	30	22
No effect	-	<b>4</b>	4	4
Hard to say	-	<b>11</b>	19	7

Will Poland's integration with the EU have a positive or negative effect on:	Clerics*		Overall population **	University graduates **
	1998	2002	2002	2002
<b>Living conditions</b>				
Rather positive	71	<b>53</b>	42	64
Rather negative	9	<b>19</b>	23	11
No effect	9	<b>11</b>	12	15
Hard to say	11	<b>17</b>	23	10
<b>Polish agriculture</b>				
Rather positive	-	<b>38</b>	26	47
Rather negative	-	<b>46</b>	53	40
No effect	-	<b>3</b>	4	3
Hard to say	-	<b>13</b>	17	10
<b>Condition of the natural environment</b>				
Rather positive	88	<b>84</b>	63	81
Rather negative	6	<b>7</b>	11	7
No effect	3	<b>5</b>	9	7
Hard to say	3	<b>4</b>	17	5
<b>Durability of Polish families</b>				
Rather positive	16	<b>10</b>	15	15
Rather negative	49	<b>64</b>	21	19
No effect	20	<b>19</b>	43	55
Hard to say	15	<b>7</b>	21	11
<b>Religiosity of the population</b>				
Rather positive	9	<b>6</b>	2***	1***
Rather negative	47	<b>51</b>	24	33
No effect	28	<b>33</b>	67	60
Hard to say	16	<b>10</b>	7	6

Source: \* Institute of Public Affairs

\*\* CBOS

\*\*\* CBOS asked whether the level of religiosity would grow, drop or stay the same.

In the opinion of the clergy, integration would not have much impact on interpersonal relations – almost one half believed that people would stay as kind toward one another as they were today.

**Table 7.** Opinions on the impact of integration on selected aspects of life

(in %)

How will the following aspects of Polish life change as a result of integration with the European Union?	Clerics*		Overall population **	University graduates **
	1998	2002	2002	2002
<b>Civic enterprise</b>				
Will probably improve	87	<b>70</b>	58	75
Will probably deteriorate	2	<b>5</b>	7	4
Will stay the same	7	<b>18</b>	22	13
Hard to say	4	<b>7</b>	13	8
<b>Unemployment</b>				
Will probably get lower	33	<b>22</b>	23	20
Will probably get higher	33	<b>45</b>	47	64
Will stay the same	17	<b>22</b>	14	10
Hard to say	17	<b>11</b>	16	6
<b>Support for populist parties</b>				
Will probably grow	-	<b>38</b>	-	-
Will probably diminish	-	<b>14</b>	-	-
Will stay the same	-	<b>30</b>	-	-
Hard to say	-	<b>18</b>	-	-
<b>Crime rate</b>				
Will probably grow	38	<b>31</b>	40	32
Will probably diminish	26	<b>32</b>	19	24
Will stay the same	20	<b>27</b>	24	32
Hard to say	16	<b>10</b>	17	12
<b>Loosening of morals</b>				
Will probably increase	70	<b>60</b>	44	51
Will probably diminish	13	<b>14</b>	8	6
Will stay the same	11	<b>21</b>	39	37
Hard to say	6	<b>5</b>	9	6
<b>Interpersonal kindness</b>				
Will probably grow	32	<b>18</b>	13	22
Will probably diminish	19	<b>24</b>	19	21
Will stay the same	43	<b>48</b>	57	50
Hard to say	6	<b>10</b>	11	7

Source: \* Institute of Public Affairs

\*\* CBOS

Most clerics did not believe that the membership of Poland in the EU would constitute a significant threat to the country's sovereignty (69%) or to the national identity of Polish citizens (63%). Opinions on this issue have not changed significantly in the past few years.

**Table 8.** Assessment of threats associated with integration

(in %)

To what degree can Poland's integration with the European Union constitute a threat to:	1998	2002
<b>Polish sovereignty</b>		
Very high / high	18	<b>27</b>
Low / very low	49	<b>43</b>
None	28	<b>26</b>
Hard to say	5	<b>4</b>
<b>National identity of Polish citizens</b>		
Very high / high	30	<b>32</b>
Low / very low	49	<b>42</b>
None	17	<b>21</b>
Hard to say	4	<b>5</b>

Source: Institute of Public Affairs

In general terms, more apprehension with respect to negative consequences of integration were reported by clerics older than 50, serving rural parishes and listening to *Radio Maryja* on a regular basis. The highest level of optimism was expressed by young clerics (up to 35 years of age), respondents assessing their financial situation as good and clerics residing in south-western Poland.

Forecasts of the aftermath of integration on various aspects of life had a varying influence on clerics' attitude toward Poland becoming a member of the European Union. As shown in analysis, clerics' attitude toward integration was for the most part associated with their estimates of the socio-political impact of integration and consequences of integration on Poland's sovereignty and the national identity of Polish citizens. These issues separated the views of integration opponents and supporters the most. Supporters of accession hoped that it would be instrumental in improving the country's economic condition, reducing unemployment, bettering living conditions and helping agriculture, without at the same time fearing that it would threaten Poland's sovereignty and the national identity of Polish citizens. In contrast, opponents most often failed to see any socio-economic advantages in accession and were apprehensive about the loss of state sovereignty and national identity. This does not

mean that clerics who opposed integration negated its positive consequences in other aspects of life. For example, most of them expected an improvement in the environmental condition, higher level of law abidance and better external security after Poland joins the European Union. However, these forecasts had a lower impact on the attitude of the clergy toward integration. Similarly, forecasts of the effect of integration on the religiosity of Polish citizens were less significant in the shaping of clerics' attitude toward the EU membership. Most clerics supported integration despite having apprehensions about its negative influence on religiosity.

**Table 9.** Connection between attitude to integration and opinions about its consequences on selected aspects of life

Expected impact of integration on the following aspects of life in Poland:	Kendall's Tau b value
- Economy	0.41
- Sovereignty	-0.38
- Material living conditions	0.37
- Unemployment	-0.36
- National identity	-0.36
- Agriculture	0.33
- External security	0.30
- Development of democracy and civic freedoms	0.29
- Reform and modernization of political and economic structures	0.29
- Interpersonal kindness	0.28
- Durability of the family	0.27
- Entrepreneurship	-0.26
- Religiosity	0.25
- Law abidance	0.25
- Crime rate	-0.23
- Environmental condition	0.17
- Support for populism	-0.12
- Loosening of morals	-0.63

Source: Institute of Public Affairs

In the opinion of surveyed clerics, advantages of integration will not be visible right after Poland joins the European Union. We will have to wait for them a few or even a dozen or so years. On this issue, clerics' opinions were to a large degree in step with those of the overall population.

**Table 10.** Assessment of the time frame required for integration advantages to become visible (in %)

Will advantages of integration be visible right away or only after a certain time?	Clerics	Overall population
	2002	2000
Right away	<b>2</b>	4
After a few years	<b>51</b>	51
After a dozen or so years	<b>39</b>	30
Never	<b>6</b>	7
Hard to say	<b>2</b>	8

Source: Institute of Public Affairs

Proponents and opponents of integration saw that issue in a slightly different light. The majority (66%) of clerics who declared their support for Poland's membership in the EU expected the positive effects of integration to be visible after a few years. Those who planned to vote against integration in the accession referendum most often (51%) believed that the effect would be visible only after a dozen or so years. It should be noted that in this group only one respondent in four (23%) considered that integration would bring no advantages at all.

In the opinion of clerics, the expansion of the European Union will be advantageous not only to Poland but also to unified Europe. While Poland may profit from integration in political and economic terms, clerics believed that its presence in the EU would strengthen Europe first and foremost in cultural as well as spiritual and moral terms.

The opinion that the entire Europe would benefit from Poland's accession was more often expressed by integration supporters than opponents. Accession supporters saw the European advantage of having Poland in its midst in all four dimensions. The majority of integration opponents, who to a large degree were sceptical about Poland adding to the European political and, most of all, economic might, had no doubt that it would strengthen Europe in terms of culture as well as spirituality and morals.



**Table 11.** Assessment of integration consequences for Europe

(in %)

Will the presence of Poland in the EU strengthen Europe:	Clerics 1998	Clerics 2002
<b>- politically:</b>		
Definitely yes	29	<b>22</b>
Probably yes	45	<b>44</b>
Probably no	16	<b>23</b>
Definitely no	2	<b>3</b>
Hard to say	8	<b>8</b>
<b>- economically:</b>		
Definitely yes	20	<b>14</b>
Probably yes	49	<b>42</b>
Probably no	23	<b>33</b>
Definitely no	2	<b>5</b>
Hard to say	6	<b>6</b>
<b>- spiritually and morally:</b>		
Definitely yes	43	<b>31</b>
Probably yes	39	<b>45</b>
Probably no	11	<b>14</b>
Definitely no	3	<b>3</b>
Hard to say	4	<b>7</b>
<b>- culturally:</b>		
Definitely yes	36	<b>31</b>
Probably yes	49	<b>50</b>
Probably no	9	<b>13</b>
Definitely no	1	<b>1</b>
Hard to say	5	<b>5</b>

Source: Institute of Public Affairs

Clerics were consistent in their opinions about integration. While their majority declared support for Poland joining the EU, they also considered that Poland would be at a disadvantage if it stayed out of that organization. Only 29% of integration opponents believed that not joining the EU would be favourable for Poland, whereas 40% considered that it would not matter much either way. Such weak opposition to our membership in the EU may ensue from the absence of an attractive and realistic alternative to accession in the political debate.

**Table 12.** Assessment of the consequences of Poland staying out of the EU

(in %)

If Poland did not join the European Union for some reason, would it be:	
- Beneficial to the country	9
- Detrimental to the country	58
- Without much significance	20
Hard to say	13

Source: Institute of Public Affairs

An analysis of clerics' views on the consequences of integration shows that they have been subject to the same changes as the views of the overall population. In five years of accession negotiations with the EU, the ideal of integration has lost some of its appeal both for the overall population and the clergy. Nevertheless, it still evokes hope for a better Polish future. In both cases, this hope is largely related to socio-economic issues: economic improvement, unemployment reduction and betterment of the population's material living conditions.

## Impact of integration on the Catholic Church

Poland's integration with the European Union seems to be viewed as a natural process by the Polish Catholic Church. Both in the organizational and spiritual dimension, the Catholic Church has always been and is today a part of the European community. Nevertheless, Poland joining organizational structures of the European Union constitutes a major challenge for both the Church institution and church-goers. The clergy perceives the consequences of integration in the context of moral and social changes that are taking place in the EU countries, and in the attitude of their societies toward the Church.

**Table 1.** Effect of integration with the EU on the position and importance of the Polish Church (in %)

How will integration with the European Union affect the position and importance of the Church in Poland? Will they:	1998	2002
- affect them positively	7	4
- not affect them	67	62
- affect them negatively	16	26
Hard to say	10	8

Source: Institute of Public Affairs

Most clerics surveyed in 2002 believed that the position of the Church would not change after integration. However, the proportion of clerics who believed that the importance of the Church would diminish has grown by 10 percentage points in the past four years. Such apprehension was expressed by approximately one quarter of surveyed clerics. The fear for the future position and importance of the Church in Poland was expressed slightly more often by priests and vicars serving rural parishes (30%), residing in eastern Poland (47%) and assessing their material situation as bad (34%). In the group of clerics who believed that the position of the Church would deteriorate after accession, there was a relatively significant proportion of integration opponents (41%), clerics holding left-wing and centrist political views (32%) and daily listeners to *Radio Maryja* (31%). Interestingly, the conviction that the Church position and importance would remain stable after accession was expressed more often by accession supporters (69%), clerics who listened to *Radio Maryja* several times a month (75%), those who served mixed urban/rural parishes (74%) and those residing in northern and south-western Poland (72% and 73% respectively).

From the Church viewpoint, an important problem in the process of integration was its consequence on social life in Poland, particularly on the life of those social groups that constituted the focus of its care and education. On one hand, integration may change our mores – propagate materialistic and consumerist attitudes, ease the access to pornography and intensify the activities of sects and new religious movements. On the other hand, Poland's accession to the European Union may bring about legislative changes in matters that now differentiate Poland from most EU countries. This refers to issues such as attempts to legalize homosexual marriages and euthanasia, or easing the accessibility of abortion. Surveyed clerics considered that problem important more than twice as often as four years ago. They also expected integration to promote materialism and consumerism – that fear has increased since four years ago by almost four percentage points. There was also much more apprehension about an easier access to abortion. Surveyed clerics believed it to be a significant problem more than twice more often than four years ago. On the other hand, nothing indicated that clerics associated integration with a possible withdrawal of religious instruction from schools, although it should be stressed that the number of respondents considering this concern as a justified one has increased substantially. There was a slight drop in responses indicating the fear of an easier access to pornography and increased activities by various sects and new religious movements. It should be noted that a slight drop in apprehension was accompanied by a significant increase in the number of respondents rejecting such eventuality. This may indicate that respondents who hitherto were undecided about the subject were now expressing a specific opinion.

A large majority of the Polish clergy has slightly modified in the past few years the manner of perceiving Polish reality. Changes in morality seemed natural and were not associated with the process of integration with the European Union. The clergy's attitude to that issue has stabilized, particularly among younger clerics who served urban parishes and supported rather than opposed joining the EU.

Significant changes have occurred in the clergy's opinions on the aftermath of the integration process, i.e. on issues with respect to which the voice of the Catholic Church differed significantly from the opinions of social groups not associated with Christianity, such as euthanasia, abortion and homosexual marriages. Relatively least apprehension was evoked by the possibility of legalizing narcotics, most – by the possibility of legalizing homosexual marriages (the number of respondents who expected a legalization of homosexual marriages

after integration has grown by 27 percentage points), legalizing euthanasia (up by 23 percentage points) and easing the access to abortion (up by 19 percentage points). Only a few years ago, almost 60% of surveyed clerics were convinced that our membership in the EU would not lead to the legalization of homosexual relations and almost 50% - to the legalization of euthanasia. Today, the number of respondents reaffirming that conviction has dropped by half.

**Table 2.** Integration of Poland with the EU and changes in social life

(in %)

Will Poland's integration with the EU cause:	Definitely yes		Quite possibly		Probably no		Definitely no	
	1998	2002	1998	2002	1998	2002	1998	2002
- increased activities by various sects and new religious movements	42	37	42	41	9	15	3	5
- easier access to abortion	17	43	49	42	18	8	8	3
- easier access to pornography	41	40	39	31	13	15	3	10
- increase of materialism and consumerism	46	50	47	40	4	6	1	2
- legalization of certain narcotics	16	23	44	43	24	20	11	9
- legalization of euthanasia	12	26	34	43	30	18	17	9
- legalization of homosexual relationships	11	24	27	41	33	20	25	12
- withdrawal of religious instruction from schools	1	6	7	17	45	41	43	28

Source: Institute of Public Affairs

The "Hard to say" option was not provided.

Greatest fears were expressed with respect to the fate of the Law on the Protection of Conceived Life. The conviction that integration would bring about an easier access to abortion was expressed by 85% of respondents - not only vicars or priests from rural parishes (84% in total – *certainty and probability of an easier access to abortion*), but also those serving urban parishes (84%). The fear was expressed by both clerics with definitely right-wing views (87%) and with left-wing and centrist views (86%), more often by integration opponents (95%), but also by its supporters (81%) and the undecided (88%).

Legalization of euthanasia after accession was expected mainly by the youngest respondents (up to the age of 35 – 75%), those holding definitely right-wing views (77%), but also those who were unable to define their political views (73%). Least apprehensive about legalization of euthanasia were clerics who held left-wing views (60%) and supporters of integration with the European Union (58%). However, an apprehension about this issue was expressed in every group by more than one half of respondents.

As concerned the next problem – legalization of homosexual relationships – 65% of all respondents considered that it would be a certain or probable consequence of integration, against only 38% in the 1998 survey. The conviction that integration would lead to the legalization of homosexual relationships was declared first and foremost by integration opponents (38%), clerics holding definitely right-wing views (31%), older than 50 (30%), interested in politics and listening to *Radio Maryja* daily or several times a week (28%).

All in all, the conviction that integration would bring about legislative changes unacceptable to the Church has grown significantly among the clergy in the past four years.

## Polish clergy in the face of changes

Surveyed clerics declared that religiosity among Polish citizens seemed to be diminishing but the collected evidence indicates that life in parishes was extraordinarily rich and versatile.

**Table 3.** Religious communities, charitable and political activities in parishes

(in %)

The following communities meet and the following activities are pursued in your parish:	
Light/Life Movement	48
Rosary groups	31
Rebirth in the Holy Ghost	25
Catholic Action	22
Catholic Youth Association (part of Catholic Action)	21
Permanent charitable activities	74
Headquarters or a meeting place for political groups	2
Several answers could be given to each question, hence the total exceeding 100%.	

Source: Institute of Public Affairs

We should add that one parish in ten hosted Neocatechumenate Communities, one in eight – Nazareth Families and one in twelve – a choir, singing group or orchestra. Politicians met or had a place for themselves in the parish facility only sporadically (2% of responses), contrary to charitable activities which were permanently pursued in three quarters of parishes. The presence of the Light/Life Movement in the parish was confirmed mainly by vicars (58%), young priests (55%), more often in urban parishes (69%) than rural (36%). These respondent groups included both integration supporters (49%) and opponents (43%).

Such well developed life of parish communities does not mean that clerics assessed the religiosity of their parishioners as particularly high: they considered it average and not standing out in any respect.

One in three surveyed clerics assessed his parishioners as more religious than the overall population and one in twelve as less religious. A good mark was given to parishioners mainly by clerics in rural parishes (40%), much less often by clerics in urban parishes (23%).

**Table 4.** Religiosity of parishioners in the opinion of their priests and vicars

(in %)

Are most local parishioners:	
- Much more religious than the overall population	10
- Somewhat more religious	22
- As religious	57
- Somewhat less religious	7
- Much less religious	1
Hard to say	3

Source: Institute of Public Affairs

Clerics indicated that the religiosity of their parishioners has somewhat diminished in the past decade (21%) than grown (12%). Their majority (57%) considered that it has not changed much. However, we should note the opinion expressed by more than one half of respondents that the form of living the faith has changed (*significantly* - 8%; *somewhat* - 49%), and that only a minority of respondents (37%) considered that it has not changed much at all. Unfortunately, we do not know the nature of these changes; we can only note that in the opinion of our respondents they have occurred to a larger degree in the overall population than among their parishioners.

**Table 5.** Changes in religiosity and the manner of living the faith in the opinion of surveyed clerics

(in %)

In the past 10 years, religiosity has:	Polish society	Church-goers in the parish
- grown	9	12
- not changed	46	57
- diminished	42	21
In the past 10 years, the manner of living the faith:	Polish society	Church-goers in the parish
- has changed significantly	11	8
- has changed somewhat	57	49
- has not changed	30	37

Source: Institute of Public Affairs

\* The "Hard to say" option was not provided.

It is interesting that respondents perceived a drop in religiosity among the overall population twice more often than among their parishioners (42% and 21% respectively). For statistics on the overall population, they relied on media reports. It is possible that a more



positive assessment of religiosity among their own parishioners resulted from their participation in the holy mass, charitable activities, etc. However, it could have also resulted from the conviction that the higher level of religiosity among parishioners was a consequence of the ministering work done by the parish priest or vicar, i.e. the respondent himself. Surveyed clerics perceived changes in the manner of living the faith more often among the overall population (68%) than in their own parish (57%). Let us add that the outcome of the assessment of religiosity among Polish citizens in the 1998 survey was similar: 44% of clerics considered that Polish citizens had become less religious in comparison with 1989 and 46% saw no difference.

A successive problem associated with the process of Poland's integration with the EU was the manner clerics perceived the direction of changes that had occurred and continued to occur in the Church and its surroundings. The topical questions encompassed both the most tangible dimension of Church functioning – its financial situation, as well as the presence of the Church in public life.

**Table 6.** Changes in the financial situation of the Church

(in %)

In the past 10 years, has it:	Financial situation			
	of the Church		of clerics	
	1998	2002	1998	2002
- improved	16	4	8	7
- stayed the same	39	30	41	40
- deteriorated	36	61	38	50
Hard to say	9	5	13	3

Source: Institute of Public Affairs

The assessment of the Church financial situation seems unequivocal – in the opinion of a majority of respondents, the situation in the Church was deteriorating, similarly to the material situation of clerics themselves. In comparison to 1998, the number of clerics declaring a deterioration in their own situation as well as that of the Church has grown substantially. Most pessimism as to the direction of changes in this sphere was expressed by older clerics (70% of responses among clerics older than 50), less often by younger clerics (45% of clerics younger than 35). The financial situation of the Church was seen in brighter colours by clerics serving parishes in south-east Poland than by those serving in the north. The same went for the financial situation of clerics themselves – it was considered better by

younger clerics than older and by those from the south than by those from the north, west and centre. It seems that clerics serving mixed urban/rural and urban parishes were having it a little easier than those serving rural parishes.

**Table 7.** Church presence in public life – assessment of changes

(in %)

Do you believe that in the past 10 years:	Grew		Fell		Stayed the same	
	1998	2002	1998	2002	1998	2002
- respect for the Catholic Church in Poland:	8	7	54	40	33	50
- respect among parishioners for their priests and vicars:	6	9	28	16	58	71
- Church influence on the shaping of public opinion:	13	6	49	43	32	47
- Church influence on state policy:	22	8	23	31	42	52
- Church presence in public life:	65	34	6	13	26	50

Source: Institute of Public Affairs

The "Hard to say" option was not provided.

Clerics were convinced of their parishioners' respect but were divided on the issue of respect felt for the Church by the overall population. They sensed that in the past 10 years respect for the Church had dropped and that the Church had lost some of its influence on the shaping of public opinion and state policy. All in all, however, they felt that the Church position in public life had remained stable.

Consequently, in the clergy's opinion, the last decade was a period in which both respect for the Church and its influence on state policy and shaping of the public opinion have diminished rather than grown. On the other hand, in respondents' opinion, Church presence in public life has grown since 1989. We should add that a few years ago that growth was perceived by 65% of clerics, whereas today – by only 34%. The composition of the Polish government and parliament has changed in 2001 – it is no wonder that a growth of the Church presence in public life was perceived by fewer clerics than in 1998, when Poland was governed by political parties of the centre-right.

Another interesting aspect was the difference in the manner of perceiving popular respect for the Catholic Church and respect for parish clerics among parishioners. As in the assessment of the drop in religiosity, more clerics perceived a drop in respect felt for the Church "in general" (40%) than in respect for parish priests and vicars among parishioners (only 16%). Similar proportions differentiated responses obtained in previous surveys conducted by the Institute of Public Affairs, but at those times clerics much more often

perceived a deterioration of respect both for the Church and for priests in parishes. It seems that the significant growth since 1998 in the number of clerics selecting the response: *"Respect for, influence and presence of the Church have not changed in the last decade"* may indicate a narrowing of the scope of the prevalent opinion that the situation of the Church was permanently and consistently deteriorating. Today's clergy seems to notice that not much has been changing in this area.

How do clerics see their role in the changing social reality which, in their opinion, produces more of a drop in the population's religiosity than growth? Their definite majority is inclined to concentrate on doing what is necessary to deepen the faith and morality of their parishioners even if it led to losing some. Just over 55% of surveyed clerics considered that seeking new forms of piety was a Church duty. For 41% placing more stress on preaching the Gospel was the most significant matter. One respondent in three gave primary importance to the dissemination of moral principles.

In the past few years, the number of clerics convinced that it was better to develop traditional forms of piety has grown (by seven percentage points to 35%). The percentage of clerics who believed in drawing to the Church the largest possible number of people even if they did not fully accept the religious dogma and preached moral principles has also grown (from 9% in 1998 to the current 22%). The number of clerics convinced of the need to place more stress on social issues and charitable activities has grown as well (by 13 percentage points to 20%). However, this does not mean that such view of clerical duties dominates in the Polish Church in 2002.

**Table 8.** Changes in the perception of Church duties toward believers

(in %)		
In your opinion, the Church in Poland should concentrate:	1998	2002
- on bringing about a deepening of faith and morality, even at the price of losing worshippers	86	74
- on seeking new forms of piety	60	56
- on preaching the Gospel	45	41
- on disseminating Christian moral principles	33	31
Several answers could be given to each question, hence the total exceeding 100%		

Source: Institute of Public Affairs

It seems that surveyed priests selected the proposition of doing what was necessary to deepen their parishioners' faith, even if it led to losing some of them, or of seeking new forms

of piety somewhat less often than a few years ago, but most (74%) still considered the former duty more fitting than drawing the largest possible number of followers to the Church despite them not fully accepting its teachings.

The final problem facing the Church in the changing world was its own position as an institution which has been both changing for two thousand years and, at the same time, holding on to its principles. Clerics asked by the Institute of Public Affairs about their attitude to differences of opinion in their own professional community had no doubt that such differences inside the Church constituted a natural phenomenon. This was the opinion of 92% of surveyed clerics (including 43% who considered attitudinal differences definitely natural). There were twice more clerics indicating that the Church in Poland should aim at a maximum homogeneity of views among the clergy (60% of responses) than be more accepting of differing opinions (32%). Clerics' support for a higher acceptance of varying views among the clergy has grown by six percentage points in the past few years. Is that approval also expressed in the differentiation of opinions about *Radio Maryja*?

**Table 9.** Convergence between the political content of *Radio Maryja* broadcasts and views of Polish clergy

(in %)

Does the political content of <i>Radio Maryja</i> broadcasts well reflect the opinions of a majority of the Polish clergy?	1998	2002
Definitely yes	12	6
Possibly yes	40	27
Possibly no	20	27
Definitely no	6	17
Hard to say	22	23

Source: Institute of Public Affairs

Hence, clerics considered the political content of *Radio Maryja* broadcasts convergent with the views of a majority of the Polish clergy somewhat less often than during the former survey. A few years ago, 52% of surveyed clerics considered these broadcasts representative against only 33% today. The number of parish priests and vicars who did not perceive such convergence between *Radio Maryja* views and those of the Polish clergy has grown since 1998 by 18 percentage points - to 44%.

The process of Poland's integration with the EU will undoubtedly increase the frequency of contacts between Polish clerics and followers of the Polish Church on one hand and Catholic churches in other European countries. Consequently, the process of comparing - finding differences and similarities - will accelerate. How do surveyed clerics see the differences between the Church in Poland and Catholic churches elsewhere in Europe?

Polish clerics perceived differences more often than their absence. As many as 44% of surveyed clerics saw "certain substantial differences" and the next 27% believed that there were many such "substantial differences". Only one respondent in five did not discern any important difference between Catholic churches in Europe and the Polish Church. It is interesting that differences were less often perceived by supporters of Poland's integration with the EU (25%), clerics who listened to *Radio Maryja* several times a month (25%), those holding definitely right-wing views (25%) and priests serving mixed urban/rural parishes (27%).

The list of main differences between the Catholic Church in Poland and Catholic churches in Europe mentioned by surveyed clerics shows how much the Polish clergy appreciates its Church for its loyalty to the Gospel and manner of conducting evangelization, traditional (and other) forms of piety, manner of experiencing the faith and intensity of religious practices.

**Table 10.**

(in %)

Differences between the Catholic Church in Poland and the Catholic Church in the EU provided by respondents	
Importance given to moral principles in Church teachings and in believers' lives, loyalty to the Gospel and to Church teachings	32
Type of piety, manner of living the faith, number and variety of ministering forms	24
Religiosity linked to tradition	22
Religious practices and use of sacraments	21
Social position of the Church, its participation in public life, connection to the Polish national identity	14
Different manner of financing the Church	14
Manner of the participation of the lay population in Church life, involvement of the lay population, attachment to the Church	11
Rituals, catechization, pilgrimages	10
Several answers could be given to each question, hence the total exceeding 100%	

Source: Institute of Public Affairs

No wonder then that when surveyed clerics were asked what Catholic churches in the EU and in Poland could learn from one another they more often found things worthy of recommending the EU countries than solutions recommendable to the Polish Church. In their opinion, these were the things worthy of learning from the Polish Church:

- 1) Piety, spirituality, strength and depth of faith, and also popular religiosity (29%);
- 2) Religious practices, believers' participation in sacraments (21%);
- 3) Living in accordance to religious principles, loyalty to the Gospel and to Church teachings (20%);
- 4) Style of ministering and involvement of Polish clerics (18%);
- 5) Loyalty and attachment to tradition, staying at a distance of novelties (16%).

Whereas in the opinion of Polish clerics the Catholic church in the EU has the following things worthy of emulating in Poland:

- 1) Participation of lay people in church life, involvement in and influence of lay people on parish life, responsibility of lay people for Church matters (20%);
- 2) Financing the Church, its activities, religious facilities, economic matters (15%);
- 3) Church organization, structure, administration, management model (10%).

There were other responses as well: charitable activities (5%) and deepening the faith (5.5%). Let us add that one parish priest and vicar in four considered it best not to adopt anything from the Catholic churches in the EU and 17% of clerics did not answer the question stating that they *did not know / were not familiar with* the activities of churches in the EU.

Among those who did not see anything in the Catholic churches in the EU that the Polish Church could adopt were clerics over 50 years of age (40%), serving rural parishes (30%), assessing their financial situation as average (35%), not interested in politics and opposed to Poland joining the EU (31%). Those who perceived elements worthy of transplanting to the Polish Church, e.g. participation of lay people in the church life, were more often clerics serving mixed urban/rural parishes (29%), interested in politics (25%), holding political views that ranged from the right through the centre to the left, and supporters of Poland joining the EU (24%). They included occasional (less than a few times a month) listeners to *Radio Maryja* (24%).

It seems that Polish clerics have a sense of belonging to a church that can offer its valuable experience to the EU countries despite the fact that, in their opinion, religiosity among Polish citizens is falling rather than growing. Integration with the EU will place in front of believers and the clergy challenges associated not as much with "moral transformations" but, in the opinion of respondents, with the possibility of legislative changes in matters of fundamental importance to the Church.

## Report on the conduct of the survey "Parish clergy on European integration".

### Parish priest sample

The survey was conducted by *Ośrodek Badania Opinii Publicznej* between October 11 and November 5, 2002, on a representative nominal sample with a reserve.


There were 300 interviews, including 192 interviews (**64%**) with respondents from the main sample and 108 (**36%**) with respondents from the reserve (at times from a reserve of the reserve).

For the purpose of conducting 300 interviews with parish priests, pollsters undertook 461 attempts to contact respondents - 300 attempts were successful, 161 attempts failed.

Pollsters learned from potential respondents in Kalisz Diocese that the local bishop had prohibited subordinate priests from participating in the survey.

Interview duration - **average – 47.4 min., median – 45 min.**

Conduct of the "Parish Priests" survey broken into weekdays – interviews accomplished





## Reasons for not conducting interviews

Reasons for not conducting interviews	Quantity	%
Refusal to participate in the survey	126	79
No contact, failure to establish contact with respondent on the date of the survey	12	7
Accidents of fate – cleric hospitalized, deceased, away for a long time, etc.	23	14
	161	100

## Refusals to participate in the survey

Refusals can be divided into several categories:

- Definite, brief, unjustified refusals;
- Refusals justified by the absence of consent from the episcopal curia, superiors;
- Refusals based on a more or less formal prohibition to participate in the survey by the episcopal curia, superiors;
- Refusals due to a mistrust of OBOP, surveys, media, fear of manipulation;
- Refusals due to the outlook on life, dislike of politics, of issues associated with the EU, negative attitude toward European integration;
- Refusals citing the voluntary nature of participation, democratic principles, civic freedoms;
- Indirect refusals, not expressed directly, consisted of avoiding making contact with the pollster, postponing successive meetings;
- Refusals justified by time deficit, being swamped with work, etc.

## Vicar sample

The survey was conducted by *Ośrodek Badania Opinii Publicznej* between October 11 and November 5, 2002, on a representative random sample with a reserve.


There were 300 interviews, including 211 (**70%**) with respondents from the main sample and 89 (**30%**) with respondents from the reserve (at times from a reserve of the reserve).

For the purpose of conducting 300 interviews with vicars, pollsters undertook 410 attempts to contact respondents. Out of that number 300 attempts were successful and 110 attempts failed.

In the Kalisz Diocese, pollsters learned that the local bishop had forbidden subordinate clerics to participate in the survey.

Duration of an interview with a vicar: **average - 47 min., median - 45 min.**

Conduct of the "Vicar" survey broken into weekdays – interviews accomplished



### Reasons for not conducting interviews

Reasons for not conducting interviews	Quantity	%
Refusal to participate in the survey	67	61
No contact, failure to establish contact with respondent on the date of the survey	21	19
Accidents of fate	22	20
	110	100

### Refusals to participate in the survey

Refusal types were generally the same as in the case of parish priests.

Interviews with vicars in a parish had to be first approved by the parish priest.

Prior to surveying vicars, pollsters solicited consent of their parish priest.